

5-7-2011

# The Morally Contaminating (and Motivating) Influence of Hate Groups in the U.S.

Andrew L. Stewart

*University of Connecticut - Storrs*, [andrwstw@icloud.com](mailto:andrwstw@icloud.com)

---

## Recommended Citation

Stewart, Andrew L., "The Morally Contaminating (and Motivating) Influence of Hate Groups in the U.S." (2011). *Master's Theses*. 102.  
[http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/gs\\_theses/102](http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/102)

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Connecticut Graduate School at DigitalCommons@UConn. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UConn. For more information, please contact [digitalcommons@uconn.edu](mailto:digitalcommons@uconn.edu).

The Morally Contaminating (and Motivating) Influence of Hate Groups in the U.S.

Andrew L. Stewart

B.S., Colorado State University, 2009

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Masters of Arts

at the

University of Connecticut

2011

APPROVAL PAGE

Masters of Arts Thesis

The Morally Contaminating (and Motivating) Influence of Hate Groups in the U.S.

Presented by

Andrew L. Stewart, B.S.

Major Advisor \_\_\_\_\_  
Felicia Pratto, Ph.D.

Associate Advisor \_\_\_\_\_  
Colin Leach, Ph.D.

Associate Advisor \_\_\_\_\_  
Thomas Craemer, Ph.D.

University of Connecticut

2011

## Acknowledgements

My interest in hate groups began with my understanding of hate crimes, lone wolves, and the harm that radical racism can have on people just trying to live their lives. For all those victims of prejudice and hatred, this thesis is dedicated to you. I am greatly indebted to those people who confront racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, and the many types of prejudice that harm so many. Without their compensatory action, group-based inequality would be worse. I would like to thank those people who bankrupt hate groups, destroy copies of the Turner Diaries, and attempt to eliminate a racism that pervades our society.

Many people have helped me with the thesis presented here. I am first grateful for my advisor, Felicia Pratto. It has been a dream come true to work with her, and her influence on my intellectual development is unmatched. I would also like to thank my secondary advisor, Colin Leach, for his steady guidance and fierce questions that only improve my work. My cohort has been with me from the beginning, and their support and company keep me grounded. Thank you Ben, Danny, Jessica, Joyce, and Rob. This thesis represents who I am as an activist, researcher, and scholar, and therefore represents the aggregated influence of these many people.

## Abstract

A growth in the number of hate groups that operate in the United States over the past decade counters many researchers' claims that overt prejudice and discrimination no longer have influence. In this thesis, we explore how people react with moral outrage and moral cleansing toward hate groups' moral transgressions of racial egalitarianism—a strong sacred value among those who desire group-based equality. Across two experiments, we find that people perceive hate groups as immoral social agents, and people express moral outrage against them. We also find that people who were morally contaminated by hate groups (i.e., by being led to believe that they share compatible ideological beliefs with hate groups) perceived more racism in their environments than people who are not morally contaminated by hate groups. We discuss implications for confronting prejudice, theoretical debates on moral licensing and moral cleansing, and engaging in progressive action to improve intergroup relations.

Keywords: Racism, Morality, Hate Groups, Discrimination

## Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	iii
Abstract.....	iv
Introduction.....	1
Perceiving Subtle Racism.....	3
Hate Groups in the United States .....	4
Morality-Based Reactions to Hate Groups.....	7
The Present Research .....	11
Pilot Study.....	12
Method .....	13
Results and Discussion.....	13
Experiment 1 .....	15
Method .....	16
Results.....	17
Discussion .....	20
Experiment 2.....	21
Method .....	21
Results.....	24
Discussion.....	27
General Discussion .....	28
Overkill or Compensation .....	29
After Perceiving Racism .....	31
Spatial Moral Contamination .....	32
Conclusion.....	33
References.....	35

## List of Tables

Table 1: List of Groups from Pilot Study .....	39
Table 2: Correlations from Experiment 1 .....	46
Table 3: Mean Perceptions of Racism from Experiment 2.....	47

## List of Figures

Figure 1: Ratings of Immorality from Experiment 1 .....	48
Figure 2: Moral Outrage from Experiment 1 .....	49
Figure 3: Perceptions of Racism from Experiment 2.....	50

## List of Appendices

Appendix A: Arguments against Immigration from Experiment 1 .....	51
Appendix B: Arguments against Affirmative Action from Experiment 2.....	52
Appendix C: Results from Pilot Study.....	53
Appendix D: Adapted Symbolic Racism Scale .....	61

### The Morally Contaminating (and Motivating) Influence of Hate Groups in the U.S.

Hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan may seem to be a vestige of a racist past, but the number of hate groups in the U.S. has increased by over 50% since 2000 (Potok, 2009). Despite their growing popularity, we predict that many people view these groups as a threat to society's moral integrity, so exposure to hate groups may cause people to react with moral outrage (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) and engage in seemingly redundant moral cleansing processes (i.e., moral overkill; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Lerner, & Green, 2000). However, there are theoretical reasons to believe that merely expressing outrage toward hate groups is not sufficient for motivating action or vigilance against them because in expressing outrage, people earn a moral license as nonracist and no longer need to show that they are nonracist (e.g., Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). Even though overt forms of prejudice and racism are taboo and discredited in contemporary society, they continue to flourish in some circles, and may produce unintended tolerance of racism even among those who disapprove of them. It may therefore be important to understand how people can remain vigilant to prejudice even if they reject its overt expressions.

An unsettled question is whether morality-based reactions toward hate groups will lead to vigilance against racism. Different theories make conflicting predictions. The sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) suggests that racial equality may be a sacred value (i.e., a value not subject to qualification or equivocation) among those who value racial egalitarianism. Whenever sacred values are violated (e.g., by hate groups), people may feel morally contaminated and may react toward the violator (e.g., a hate group) with moral outrage, and seek to morally cleanse themselves by seeking

opportunities to rid themselves of the contamination. According to the moral credentials model, rejecting hate groups could socially license people as non-racist, so they may not need to perceive racism in their environments to demonstrate their non-racism (Monin & Miller, 2001). According to the overkill hypothesis in the sacred value protection model, however, exposure to hate groups may make people overreact with several redundant moral defense strategies (i.e., even more moral outrage and moral cleansing), which would make them perceive racism in their environments (Tetlock et al., 2000). Thus, it remains unclear whether expressing the view that hate groups are immoral will make one sensitive to prejudice or not. The present thesis tests whether hate groups have power and influence to increase tolerance of racism even though people may reject them as immoral social agents. We also test whether making people aware of this hateful contamination in their lives may increase the likelihood that they recognize prejudice and protest against it.

In the present research, we explore people's perceptions of and reactions toward hate groups in the United States at present. We begin with an analysis of the current state of hate groups in the U.S. along with an examination of the hate groups' belief systems and ideologies. We suggest that hate groups, who are mostly white supremacist groups, provide an ideological contrast to racial egalitarianism and thus by definition violate the principle of racial egalitarianism. We then explore morality-based reactions people may experience after exposure to hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. When people who value egalitarian group relations feel as though they share similar beliefs and opinions as a hate group, they can be morally contaminated and thus motivated to morally cleanse themselves. We then propose two experiments to explore how people perceive and react to hate groups.

### **Perceiving Subtle Racism**

Prejudice and discrimination cannot be separated from their social, cultural, and historical contexts. From the times of the pre-Civil Rights era in the 1950s and 1960s to contemporary society, psychologists have claimed that the nature of prejudice has changed (see Duckitt, 1992). In this “new” era of racial politics, psychologists have suggested that prejudice operates from at least two levels (i.e., the explicit and implicit; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997), and the “new” form of prejudice is subtle and covert (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997). Some research, for example, has shown that people are not even aware of some stereotypes that have existed for centuries (e.g., Negro-Ape metaphor; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). These findings suggest that people may be detached from the issues of race and racism in U.S. society, and this detachment may be explained by the subtle and covert form of racism. The end of *de jure* racial discrimination makes it difficult for people to literally see how people and institutions continue to discriminate against people of color in the United States because there are very few physical, visual symbols of institutionalized or individual racism (e.g., “Whites Only” signs). People may therefore be less vigilant to racism because perceiving subtle racism is difficult.

The end of overt and legal racial discrimination can make it difficult for people to label acts of racism that might find their way into political discourse. Thus, when attempting to understand arguments in debates of public policy (e.g., affirmative action, immigration, and so on), people may be unaware of or unsure of the racist content in political discourse. Although there may be principled reasons for arguing against policies aimed at achieving racial equality (e.g., affirmative action and principled conservatism;

Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991), these types of political discourse typically have racist and group dominance-related undercurrents (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). The arguments and messages that hate groups promote can find their way into political discourse, and people may be unaware of the source of these arguments. Ultimately, these arguments are based in racism. It may be important to understand how people increase their vigilance against subtle and covert forms of prejudice and racism by elucidating the racist sources of the political discourse surrounding various public policies.

### **Hate Groups in the United States**

Even though contemporary research on prejudice stresses the covert nature of racism (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997), overt forms of racism and prejudice still exist in contemporary society (Leach, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Hate groups, for example, may represent the last stand of the formal, overt prejudice and discrimination that people believe have been eliminated since the U.S. Civil Rights Movement. Hate groups are hierarchy-enhancing social agents (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 38) because their presence in the U.S. and around the world contributes to group-based social hierarchy and increased prejudice and discrimination. Thus, understanding how these prejudiced social groups can increase prejudice in society even in a society that is intolerant of overt racism may be important in understanding how even overt forms of prejudice can still successfully operate in contemporary society.

Hate groups are organizations whose “beliefs and practices...attack or malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics” (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2010). Hate groups’ mission statements overtly identify social groups they

find to be problematic and blatantly advocate discrimination against those social groups (e.g., deportation, isolation, or extermination). Hate groups can also be identified by exploring various ideological patterns that are common to all hate groups (i.e., conspiracism, dualism, and apocalypticism; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). In 2000, 602 hate groups were active in the U.S., and in 2009, 932 hate groups were active in the U.S. (Potok, 2010)—an average growth of more than 30 hate groups per year. Compiling population data from the 2010 U.S. Census and from the Southern Poverty Law Center's (SPLC) count of the number of hate groups in the U.S., there are on average four hate groups for every one million people in the United States. The SPLC—an anti-hate group organization—suggests that the recent trend in hate groups is a growth in anti-government militia groups (Potok, 2010). Other more historical hate groups currently operate in the U.S. including the Ku Klux Klan, National Socialist Workers Party (Nazi Party), and Skinheads.

Hate groups share an ideological pattern that emphasizes conspiracism, dualism, and apocalypticism (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). Conspiracism is the belief that major historical events are caused by some conspiracy of elite groups in society trying to maintain their control of all citizens. Hate groups believe that all people are dichotomized into “good” and “evil,” and their group's members are good while everyone else is evil (i.e., dualism). Finally, members of hate groups believe that an imminent war between groups will force hate group members to fight against those they hate, so they are preparing for the war by recruiting members and disseminating propaganda (i.e., apocalypticism; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). These three components of hate groups' ideologies oppose hierarchy-attenuating ideologies of egalitarianism and universalism.

Hate groups can be separated into three very broad categories, which are not always distinct from one another. Political hate groups generally derive their ideologies from Nazi and neo-Nazi doctrine, and their group's organizational structure reflects their authoritarian and hierarchical ideology (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). These political hate groups believe in the inherent superiority of the White race over all others and believe that all other races should be either removed from existence or deported from the country in order to protect white culture. These groups are nationalist and invest in the promotion of a purely white society, so they promote ingroup favoritism, reject interracial interactions (e.g., immigration and especially miscegenation; Glaser, Dixit, & Green, 2002), and decry perceived attempts at disadvantaging the white race (e.g., affirmative action).

Religious hate groups, on the other hand, derive their ideologies from religious doctrine and orthodoxy, and they use religion to legitimize their hateful, discriminatory stance against outgroup members (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). Some examples of these groups include Christian Identity, Creativity Movement, and the White Order of Thule. The Christian Identity Movement, for example, believes that white European people from Great Britain and Germany are God's chosen people, and they also believe that Jewish people are the descendants of Satan and Eve from the Garden of Eden (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). Christian Identity followers also believe that Jews install blacks and other people of color in positions of power in order to prepare for the race war that will come as prophesized in the book of Revelations in the Christian Bible (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006).

The third broad category is the youth cultural sector, which is a relatively informal type of hate group (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). These groups include Skinheads, Black Metal (a hateful musical propaganda group), and other informal hate movements. The Skinheads represent a countercultural, youth movement, which has its origins in punk rock from England. Skinheads attend parties and rallies and attack outgroup members without notice or pre-planning (Schafer & Navarro, 2003). These various types of hate groups represent a social movement in the U.S. that seeks to eradicate outgroup members and promote an ingroup identity that derives its self-perceived “legitimacy” from hierarchy-enhancing ideologies that promote prejudice and discrimination. The ideologies that hate groups follow contradict and violate racial egalitarianism, which is a sacred value held by many people in the United States.

### **Morality-Based Reactions to Hate Groups**

Some values that people hold cannot be violated under any circumstances (e.g., assessing the monetary worth of human life; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) whereas other values can be acceptable under certain circumstances (e.g., lying). When people’s sacred values are threatened (e.g., hate groups threaten racial egalitarianism), they can become intuitive moralists-theologians, who engage in a struggle to be morally clean and avoid morally contaminating thoughts or behaviors. People who experience actual or perceived moral contamination engage in moral outrage and moral cleansing (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Lerner, & Green, 2000).

For a variety of reasons including the U.S.’s history of race relations, racial equality has become a sacred value that should not be violated under any circumstances. It can be taboo for some people to blatantly advocate racial inequality (Monin & Miller,

2001; Plant & Devine, 2009). For example, people who are asked to set prices for insurance policies in different communities express moral outrage and moral cleansing when they discover that the insurance prices would differentially affect black and white customers (Tetlock et al., 2000). The sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) provides a theoretical basis for understanding how people may react to violators of racial equality with moral outrage and moral cleansing among people who value group-based equality. Because the vast majority of hate groups blatantly attempt to disadvantage racial minorities, they may be perceived as immoral social agents by people who value group-based equality, and those people may express moral outrage against them.

Racist hate groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan and Skinheads) by definition violate racial egalitarianism, so people who desire and value group-based equality may react toward these groups with moral outrage and moral cleansing. Moral outrage is conceptualized to have three components that are based in affective, cognitive, and behavioral reactions toward a violator of a sacred value. These include (1) harsh dispositional attributions, (2) anger, contempt, and/or disgust toward the violator, and (3) support for punishing the violator (Tetlock et al., 2000). When people feel as though they are morally contaminated by a violator of a sacred value, they may engage in moral cleansing. Even the mere contemplation of a sacred value violation can be morally contaminating for people (Tetlock et al., 2000). Moral cleansing is closely related to self-affirmation processes (see Steele, 1988) in which people attempt to rid themselves of a moral contaminant by reaffirming themselves as moral. However, in contrast to Steele's (1988) contention that people can affirm other unrelated aspects of the self to resolve any conflicts between cognitions or behavior and cognition, people attempt to rid themselves

of a moral contaminant by directly addressing their moral failing. Thus, when people who value equal group relations violate racial egalitarianism, they should be motivated to repair their moral failing in race relations and may thus perceive more racism in their environments.

When people encounter immoral social agents, they may respond with moral outrage and moral cleansing, which may have different consequences for being attuned to other moral contaminants in their environments. People who are morally contaminated by an immoral social agent may be motivated to morally cleanse themselves, and this motivation is hypothesized to increase people's vigilance to opportunities to directly confront the contaminant (cf. Steele, 1988; Tetlock et al., 2000). In the case of hate groups and racism, people who are morally contaminated by hate groups' presence or an association with the group (e.g., sharing the same beliefs as hate groups) may then be motivated to morally cleanse themselves by seeking opportunities to condemn racism or racist people and institutions. Contaminated people may then be more vigilant to racism in their environments; they may need to show that they are aware of and reject racism. Failures to perceive racism are major deterrents to confronting prejudice (Ashburn-Nardo, Morris, & Goodwin, 2008).

In addition to this heightened vigilance against racism for those who are motivated to morally cleanse themselves, there is a debate relevant to how vigilant people will be to racism after they have expressed moral outrage and anger-based responses. Tetlock et al. (2000) outline two possible strategies people use when confronted with a moral contaminant such as hate groups: moral compensation or moral overkill. According to the compensatory hypothesis, people express moral outrage that attempts to distance

themselves from the contaminant. People therefore compensate for the contaminant by directly rejecting it, and they no longer need to do anything else because they adequately compensated for its contaminating influence. This compensatory hypothesis has been supported by a variety of research on people who deal with potential moral failings (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva, Ilic, & Medin, 2009; Schnall, Benton & Harvey, 2008; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). People who feel morally affirmed or cleansed condone future instances of immorality. Monin and Miller (2001) find support for a moral credentials model in which people who have demonstrated that they are not racist or sexist are more likely to be racist or sexist in future situations than people who did not first establish themselves as nonprejudiced. We should expect then in line with this compensatory hypothesis that expressing moral outrage against hate groups may relieve people of being aware of future instances of racism. According to this compensatory hypothesis, people who express moral outrage should be less vigilant to racism than people who did not express moral outrage against a hate group.

There are theoretical reasons to believe, however, that expressing moral outrage against a hate group (vs. not expressing moral outrage) may increase people's vigilance against racism in their environments in the same manner that people who are motivated to morally cleanse themselves are likely to be more vigilant to racism. According to the overkill hypothesis, people engage in many and redundant moral reactions when faced with a moral contaminant (Tetlock et al., 2000). Instead of being "done" after expressing moral outrage against a moral contaminant (i.e., the compensatory hypothesis), people may express even more moral outrage and also seek opportunities to morally cleanse themselves despite having already expressed moral outrage. People may thus engage in

these overkill moral responses when faced with a moral contaminant. The overkill hypothesis is likely to be supported when expressing outrage or cleansing oneself is not costly and when the moral contaminant is especially extreme in violating a sacred value. Tetlock et al. (2000) find support for the overkill hypothesis when the sacred value violator is especially egregious. The overkill hypothesis roughly maps onto the predictions that would be made by research suggesting that catharsis is not effective in alleviating aggressive thoughts and actions (Bushman, 2002). People when exposed to hate groups will not merely express outrage and be done, but they will also express more outrage later and seek opportunities to morally cleanse themselves. We should expect, then, in line with the overkill hypothesis that people who express moral outrage against hate groups will be more vigilant to racism in their environments than people who do not express moral outrage against hate groups.

### **The Present Research**

The present research examines how people perceive hate groups (e.g., as immoral), react to hate groups (e.g., moral outrage and moral cleansing), and how people who are contaminated by hate groups may be motivated to remain vigilant to racism. The present research also compares predictions from two theoretical models that would make opposite predictions. According to the moral credentials model (Monin & Miller, 2001), people who have established themselves as moral by rejecting prejudice should no longer be vigilant to prejudice and may actually behave in more prejudiced ways later. Thus, people who express moral outrage against hate groups should perceive less racism in their environments than people who have not been able to establish themselves as moral. In contrast, the sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) predicts an overkill

hypothesis in which people who engage in moral outrage will perceive more racism in a seemingly redundant defense of a moral contaminant. Also, people who are motivated to morally cleanse themselves will perceive more racism in their environments in order to directly confront racism.

Our reasoning here depends on the assumptions that hate groups are in fact perceived to be immoral social agents and that people will express moral outrage toward them. Experiment 1 tests these assumptions. Experiment 2 tests the prediction that when hate groups morally contaminate people, they will subsequently recognize racism in their environments more than people who have not been morally contaminated. People will perceive more racism in their environments when they have become psychologically associated with hate groups (i.e., morally contaminated by them) than people who have not become morally contaminated by hate groups because they will be motivated to seek opportunities to morally cleanse themselves. Also, with regard to the opposing predictions of people's vigilance against racism after expressing moral outrage, we seek to test whether the compensatory hypothesis or the overkill hypothesis are supported after people express moral outrage against a hate group (Tetlock et al., 2000). The present research explores how hate groups can make people more or less vigilant to racism in their environments, which can have important implications for confronting prejudice and seeking egalitarian group relations.

### **Pilot Study**

We conducted a pilot study drawn from the same population as the experimental participants to identify the groups with which our participants had the most familiarity and could identify correctly. We included a variety of hate groups, politically liberal

groups, and politically conservative groups to see if such groups are familiar to participants and could correctly identify them as racist, liberal, or conservative.

### **Method**

**Participants.** We recruited 67 undergraduate students to participate in this study for partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were 61% male, 81% white, and 19 years old on average.

**Procedure.** Participants were invited to a large lecture room where they completed ratings of 45 groups. We used the names of 15 hate groups identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center. We identified another 15 groups that were politically liberal organizations according to their self identification and from their mission statements (e.g., MoveOn and League of Women Voters). We also identified 15 groups that were politically conservative organizations according to their self identification and from their mission statements (e.g., Focus on the Family and Alliance Defense Fund). We administered four versions of the survey that randomly presented all 45 groups in four different orders to participants.

**Measures.** Participants rated each group on how familiar, racist, liberal, and conservative they thought each group was. They rated each group on a scale from 1 (*not at all familiar, racist, liberal, or conservative*) to 7 (*very familiar, racist, liberal, or conservative*).

### **Results and Discussion**

Table 1 displays the complete listing of the groups that participants rated, followed by the type of organization (i.e., hate, liberal, or conservative), descriptive statistics of the measures for each group, and whether or not participants correctly

identified the organization's type (i.e., hate, liberal, or conservative). Participants reported being familiar with six of the 45 groups, as indicated by familiarity scores above the midpoint of the rating scale (i.e., greater than 3.5). Among the 39 groups that were rated as unfamiliar, participants reported being equally *unfamiliar* with the hate (M=1.81), liberal (M=1.70), and conservative (M=1.73) groups,  $F(2, 132) = 1.54, p > .10$ . Participants, in general, were unfamiliar with hate, liberal, and conservative groups, which suggests that participants may not be vigilant to prejudice or bias because they do not know what these political groups are.

Participants correctly classified the following six groups as racist, liberal, or conservative. Skinheads were rated as more racist (M=6.28) than it was rated liberal (M=2.55) and conservative (M=4.87),  $F(1, 61) = 131.09, p < .001, d = 2.93$ . The Ku Klux Klan was rated as more racist (M=6.55) than liberal (M=2.25) and conservative (M=5.19),  $F(1, 63) = 146.29, p < .001, d = 3.05$ . The Democratic Party was rated as more liberal (M=6.02) than conservative (M=2.14) and racist (M=1.80),  $F(1, 64) = 334.07, p < .001, d = 4.57$ . Planned Parenthood was rated as more liberal (M=5.34) than conservative (M=2.70) and racist (M=1.32),  $F(1, 62) = 107.21, p < .001, d = 2.63$ . The Republican Party was rated as more conservative (M=6.02) than liberal (M=2.18) and racist (M=3.22),  $F(1, 64) = 158.89, p < .001, d = 3.15$ . The National Rifle Association was rated as more conservative (M=5.20) than liberal (M=2.90) and racist (M=2.37),  $F(1, 58) = 174.04, p < .001, d = 3.46$ . Participants were able to correctly identify the Ku Klux Klan and Skinheads as racist organizations, which suggests that these groups are exemplars of the hate group category for participants. This finding suggests that exposure to the Ku

Klux Klan and Skinheads could morally contaminate participants because participants recognize them as racist organizations.

### **Experiment 1**

Experiment 1 tests the basic assumptions and hypotheses that hate groups are seen as immoral social agents, who will evoke moral outrage. We randomly assigned participants to conditions in which they were told that an argument against immigration came from either the KKK, Republican Party, or American Atheists in a between-subjects design. The KKK was used to represent hate groups because they express a variety of sociopolitical views, whereas Skinheads are not particularly political (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). Also, the KKK was seen as an exemplar of racist organizations, as identified in the pilot study, so they would be most likely to evoke moral outrage. Because Americans view atheists as immoral social agents (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006), we selected them as a control group in this experiment. If the KKK is seen as more immoral than or just as immoral as atheists, then we would find convergent evidence that the KKK is seen as an immoral social agent. The Republican Party was selected as a third control group because they hold some of the same sociopolitical views as the KKK (e.g., anti-immigration, anti-affirmative action, and so on), but they are not overtly racist like the KKK. The inclusion of the Republican Party controls for the effect of political conservatism in the perception of immorality and moral outrage against violations to racial equality.

## Method

**Participants.** We recruited 85 undergraduate students who participated in this experiment for partial course credit. Participants were 60% female, 77% white, and 19 years old on average.

**Procedure.** Participants read an argument in favor of anti-immigration policies, which is shown in Appendix A. After participants read the argument, we measured moral outrage against the groups and perceptions of morality. Participants completed demographic information, the 16 item social dominance orientation scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and a measure of political orientation. Participants were debriefed and thanked for their time.

**Measures.** Participants completed measures of moral outrage, perceptions of morality, social dominance orientation, and political orientation.

**Moral Outrage.** Participants completed a six item measure of moral outrage ( $\alpha=.91$ ) adapted from Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, and Green (2000). Two items were selected to represent each component of moral outrage and were rated on a scale from 1 to 7 (except for the second punish violator item indicated below) with different anchors for each item, which are shown in brackets next. The items measuring harsh dispositional attributions were “Someone who is willing to join this group is [very compassionate/very cruel]” and “This group is [not at all offensive/highly offensive].” The items measuring emotional responses to the group were “This group evokes [no anger/a great deal of anger]” and “This group is [not at all offensive/highly offensive].” The items measuring support for punishing the violator were “This group [should be banned/should be

permitted]” and “I would like to [seek out/avoid] this group’s company.” This latter item was measured on a scale from 1 to 9.

***Perceptions of Morality.*** Participants rated how immoral they thought the group was with one item on a scale from 1 (*highly moral*) to 7 (*highly immoral*).

***Social Dominance Orientation.*** Participants completed the 16 item social dominance orientation scale ( $\alpha=.87$ ; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which has traditionally been used to measure the extent to which people desire unequal group relations. This interpretation of the scale, however, focuses on only one pole of the scale. For our purposes, we reverse coded the social dominance orientation scale to measure how much people desire *equal* group relations. Participants rated these 16 items on a scale from 1 (*strongly oppose*) to 7 (*strongly favor*), and example items include “Increased social equality” and “Inferior groups should stay in their place.”

***Political Orientation.*** Participants self reported their political orientation using the political economic conservatism scale reported by Pratto et al. (1994). This scale consisted of three items asking participants to indicate how liberal or conservative they were on a scale from 1 (*very liberal*) to 7 (*very conservative*) on social, economic, and foreign policy issues ( $\alpha=.87$ ).

## **Results**

Table 2 displays the correlation matrix for all study variables both for the entire sample and split by condition.

***Perceptions of Morality.*** We conducted a one-way analysis of variance with the source of the argument as the independent variable and perceptions of morality as the dependent variable. We found a significant main effect for the source of the argument on

perceptions of morality,  $F(2, 82) = 8.11, p < .001$ . Tukey multiple comparison tests reveal that the Ku Klux Klan ( $M=5.72$ ) was seen as more immoral than the Republican Party ( $M=4.54$ ) ( $d=.91$ ; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .54, 1.84) and American Atheists ( $M=4.64$ ) ( $d=.79$ ; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .43, 1.73).

Because we expected that the KKK would represent a violator of the racial equality sacred value, we predicted that the KKK would be seen as especially immoral among people who desire equal group relations. Among the 85 participants in this study, three participants fell below the midpoint of the social dominance orientation reverse coded scale. Thus, it would not be radical to suggest that virtually all of our participants value group-based equality. However, to compare participants who may moderately desire group based equality to participants who extremely desire group based equality, we ran regression analysis with indicator variables for each of the three conditions (i.e., KKK, Republican Party, and American Atheists), reverse coded social dominance orientation, and the interactions between each condition indicator and social dominance orientation. We centered social dominance orientation to avoid multicollinearity and to aid in interpretation (see Jaccard, Wan, & Turrisi, 1990). We found that the KKK was seen as more immoral than the Republican Party ( $\beta=.39, t(79)=3.49, p < .001$ ) and American Atheists ( $\beta=.34, t(79)=3.02, p < .01$ ), controlling for the mean level of social dominance orientation and the interaction effects. Figure 1 displays a box plot of our results. Also, social dominance orientation was a significant predictor of how immoral the groups were perceived. People who extremely desired equal group relations were more likely to see each group as more immoral than people who moderately desired equal

group relations,  $\beta=.22$ ,  $p<.05$ . Social dominance orientation did not significantly interact with any of the indicator variables for the experimental conditions,  $|t(79)|<1$ .

**Moral Outrage.** We conducted a one-way analysis of variance with the source of the argument as the independent variable and moral outrage as the dependent variable. We found a significant main effect for the source of the argument on perceptions of morality,  $F(2, 82) = 14.28$ ,  $p<.001$ . Tukey multiple comparison tests reveal that the Ku Klux Klan ( $M=6.10$ ) was seen as more immoral than the Republican Party ( $M=4.67$ ) ( $d=1.21$ ; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .81, 2.06) and American Atheists ( $M=4.63$ ) ( $d=1.29$ ; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .81, 2.10). The mean levels indicate that although participants expressed moral outrage against all three groups on average, the Ku Klux Klan was rated extremely so by almost all participants.

We wanted to test whether people who desire group-based equality would be especially morally outraged against the KKK than they would be against the Republican Party or American Atheists, which would be represented by a significant interaction between social dominance orientation and experimental condition. Therefore, we conducted a linear regression analysis with indicator variables for each of the three conditions (i.e., KKK, Republican Party, and American Atheists), reverse coded social dominance orientation, and the interactions between each condition indicator and social dominance orientation. Again, we centered social dominance orientation. Figure 2 displays a box plot of our results. We found that people expressed more moral outrage against the KKK than against the Republican Party ( $\beta=.44$ ,  $t(81)=4.54$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and American Atheists ( $\beta=.44$ ,  $t(81)=4.46$ ,  $p<.001$ ), controlling for the mean level of social

dominance orientation and the interaction effects. The interaction effects between social dominance orientation and the indicator variables for the sources of the argument were not significant,  $|t(81)| < 1$ . Participants who strongly desire equal group relations were more likely to express moral outrage against all groups than participants who moderately desired equal group relations,  $\beta = .42$ ,  $p < .01$ .

### **Discussion**

Consistent with our hypotheses, participants saw the KKK as more immoral than the Republican Party and American Atheists, even though the same policy ideas were attributed to each group. Because atheists are already seen as immoral in the U.S. (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006), we found support for the idea that hate groups are seen as immoral because they were seen as even more immoral than atheists. Participants also expressed more moral outrage against the KKK than toward the Republican Party and American Atheists, even though the argument against immigration attributed to each group was the same. Participants who valued group equality were more likely to view each group as immoral and to express moral outrage than participants who did not value group equality as much. These findings suggest that among those people who value group equality, the KKK can evoke moral outrage because they are seen as immoral for violating the racial equality sacred value. Because participants read an argument against immigration to the U.S., all sources of the arguments (i.e., KKK, Republican Party, and American Atheists) violated the racial equality sacred value, which may explain the lack of an interaction between social dominance orientation and the source of the arguments. However, the KKK was seen as more immoral and evoked more moral outrage than the Republican Party and American Atheists.

## Experiment 2

Hate groups sometimes use subtle, persuasive messages to promote their ideologies, so people may not always express moral outrage in response to hierarchy-enhancing racist messages. Instead, people can become “contaminated” by hate groups, which we suggest will cause people to actively seek opportunities to morally cleanse themselves. We predict in Experiment 2 that seeking to morally cleanse oneself will lead to greater vigilance for racism in one's environment than people who do not seek to morally cleanse themselves. The moral credentials model (Monin & Miller, 2001) predicts that people who express moral outrage will not perceive as much racism in their environments than participants who did not express moral outrage. The sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) predicts that people who engage in overkill moral defensive processes, so people who express moral outrage should perceive just as much racism as participants who seek to morally cleanse themselves. We test these opposing models in the present experiment.

### Method

**Participants.** We recruited 150 undergraduate students to participate in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were 71% female, 69% white, and 19 years old on average.

**Procedure.** Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions that manipulated whether the participants knew the source of some arguments against affirmative action. The arguments are shown in Appendix B. In the before-argument condition, participants read arguments against affirmative action and were told up front that these arguments came from the Ku Klux Klan website. These arguments actually

came from a blog posting on stormfront.org, a popular racist website. Participants were then asked “Please write about the merits of the arguments, if any exist.” They then wrote a free response to this prompt in which they could agree or disagree with the arguments, although the wording of the instructions suggests that participants should write about the ways in which they agree with the arguments. The default task for participants was to agree with the arguments, so participants had to actively disagree with the arguments if they wanted. In the after-argument condition, participants read the same arguments against affirmative action, but they were not told the source of the arguments. They then were asked “Please write about the merits of the arguments, if any exist.” After they wrote about the merits of the arguments, they were told that those arguments were made by the Ku Klux Klan. Thus, participants who agreed with the arguments were lead to think that they shared the same beliefs as the KKK, which is morally contaminating for those who value group-based equality. A third condition was an untreated control group, where participants read the arguments and then were asked to “Please write about the merits of arguments if any exist” without any mention of the KKK.

After this knowledge-of-source manipulation, all participants completed a measure of positive and negative affect, and they then read parts of a mission statement from the Council for Conservative Citizens, which is a covert hate group identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center. This mission statement contains 14 parts that represent the views and beliefs of the Council for Conservative Citizens. In the pilot study reported above, each part was rated on how racist it was perceived to be from 1 (*not at all racist*) to 7 (*very racist*). Two parts of the mission statement were selected for use in this experiment because they were perceived to be moderately racist, represented by racist

perception scores ranging around the midpoint of the scale (i.e., approximately 3.5). Part two of the mission statement was selected because it specifically concerned the organization's views of race in the U.S. All 14 parts of the mission statement are displayed in Appendix C along with how racist, liberal, and conservative they were perceived to be by the 67 pilot participants. The three parts selected for use in Experiment 2 are presented first. We suggest that these three parts could be seen as ambiguously racist or not racist and still represent the organization's views on race in the U.S.

After reading these three parts to the mission statement, participants completed an adapted version of the symbolic racism 2000 scale (Henry & Sears, 2002) to assess how racist participants thought the organization was. Participants then completed measures of social dominance orientation, political orientation, anti-black prejudice, and demographic information and then debriefed and thanked for their time.

### **Measures.**

*Perceptions of Racism.* We adapted a measure of symbolic racism from the scale reported in Henry and Sears (2002). Six items were used to create our measure of how racist participants thought the group was ( $\alpha=.69$ ). Appendix D displays the complete scale, including all anchors. Instead of the items from the symbolic racism 2000 scale referencing the how participants themselves would respond to the items, we adapted the items to reference how the group whose mission statement they just read might respond to the items. For example, the original item on the symbolic racism 2000 scale was "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve." Our parallel adapted item was "This organization believes that over the past few years, blacks have gotten more than they deserve."

***Positive and Negative Affect.*** Participants completed the 20 item positive and negative affect schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants rated how they currently feel on 10 words denoting positive affect ( $\alpha=.90$ ; e.g., interested, strong, enthusiastic) and on 10 words denoting negative affect ( $\alpha=.85$ ; e.g., upset, scared, ashamed) on a scale from 1 (*very slightly or not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*).

***Other Measures.*** Participants completed the same measures of social dominance orientation ( $\alpha=.91$ ) and political orientation ( $\alpha=.86$ ) as they did in Experiment 1. Additionally, participants completed the 20 item Attitudes Toward Blacks scale ( $\alpha=.81$ ; Brigham, 1993). Some example items include “Black and white people are inherently equal” and “Generally, blacks are not as smart as whites.” Participants rated these items on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

## **Results**

***Coding of Agreement with the Argument.*** Participants were asked to “write about the merits of the argument” against affirmative action in a free response format. We decided to make agreement the default because the prompt for the free response lead participants to agree with the arguments if they followed experimenter demand. If there were no explicit disagreements with the arguments, participants were coded as agreeing with the arguments, although this may have been due in part to experimenter demand and the wording of the prompt. They were asked to “Please write about the merits of the arguments, if any exist.” If participants indicated any form of disagreement with the arguments, they were coded as disagreeing with the arguments, and this behavior can be considered proactive given the wording of the prompt. Two coders, blind to experimental condition, coded each participant’s response as either agreeing (coded as a

'0') or disagreeing (coded as a '1'). The inter-rater agreement for this coding was good ( $\kappa=.75$ ). Disagreements were settled after discussion.

**Positive and Negative Affect.** We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance with positive and negative affect as the two dependent variables (higher scores indicate greater experience of affect) and with condition (i.e., before-argument, after-argument, control) and agreement (i.e., agree or disagree with the arguments) as the independent variables. We found a marginally significant main effect of agreement with the argument on positive and negative affect ( $F(2, 143) = 2.64, p < .10$ ). The condition effect and the interaction between condition and agreement were not significant ( $F_s < 1$ ). Participants experienced the same levels of positive and negative affect in the outrage ( $M_p=2.84; M_n=1.47$ ), contamination ( $M_p=2.64; M_n=1.53$ ), and control ( $M_p=2.59; M_n=1.53$ ). Univariate tests reveal that participants who disagreed with the argument experienced greater negative affect ( $M=1.61$ ) than participants who agreed with the argument ( $M=1.29$ ),  $t(148) = 2.28, p < .05, d=.37$ . Despite this significant mean difference, the mean levels of negative affect were at the bottom of the scale, so participants did not experience very much negative affect.

**Perceptions of Racism.** We conducted a two-way analysis of variance with knowledge-of-source condition (i.e., before-argument, after-argument, control) and agreement (i.e., agree or disagree with the arguments) as the independent variables and our adapted symbolic racism measure as the dependent variable. We did not find significant main effects for condition ( $F(2, 144) < 1$ ) or the agreement factors ( $F(1, 144) < 1$ ). We did, however, find a marginally significant interaction effect of agreement and condition on perceptions of symbolic racism,  $F(2, 144) = 2.83, p=.06$ . Because symbolic

racism has bases in political conservatism and old-fashioned racism (Henry & Sears, 2002) and because hate groups are perceived to violate the racial equality sacred value by being racist (Experiment 1), we statistically controlled for the effects of political orientation, attitudes toward blacks, and social dominance orientation. When controlling for all three of these covariates, we found a significant interaction effect of agreement and condition on perceptions of symbolic racism,  $F(2, 141) = 3.07, p < .05$ . Table 3 displays the adjusted means for perceptions of symbolic racism. Our treatment comparisons are conducted using this model controlling for political orientation, attitudes toward blacks, and social dominance orientation.

We were interested in four treatment comparisons. Figure 3 displays a box plot of the results (see Lane & Sandor, 2009). We were interested in whether becoming contaminated by the KKK would make people perceive more racism in their environments, which occurred in the after-argument condition when participants agreed with the arguments made. We will compare this condition to the cases where (1) participants were not contaminated by the KKK (i.e., in the after-argument condition when they disagreed with the arguments), (2) participants knew the arguments came from the KKK (before-argument condition) and disagreed with them, (3) participants knew the arguments came from the KKK (before-argument condition) and agreed with them, and (4) participants agreed with the arguments but the KKK was never mentioned (i.e., control condition).

(1) Participants who were morally contaminated by the KKK perceived more racism in the mission statement ( $M=4.30$ ) than participants who were not morally contaminated by the KKK ( $M=3.88$ ),  $F(1, 144) = 3.83, p = .05, d = .55$ . (2) Participants

who were morally contaminated by the KKK did not perceive more racism in the mission statement ( $M=4.30$ ) than participants who knew the arguments came from the KKK and disagreed with them ( $M=4.2$ ),  $F(1, 141) < 1$ ,  $d=.14$ . (3) Participants who were morally contaminated by the KKK perceived more racism in the mission statement ( $M=4.30$ ) than participants who knew the arguments came from the KKK and agreed with the arguments ( $M=3.85$ ),  $F(1, 141) = 4.73$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $d=.59$ . (4) Participants who were morally contaminated by KKK did not perceive more racism in the mission statement ( $M=4.30$ ) than participants who agreed with the arguments but were never told about the KKK ( $M=4.01$ ),  $F(1, 141) = 1.91$ ,  $p > .10$ ,  $d=.37$ .

### **Discussion**

We hypothesized the participants who were motivated to morally cleanse themselves would perceive more racism in their environment than participants who were not motivated to morally cleanse themselves. Participants who were morally contaminated by the Ku Klux Klan perceived more racism than participants who disagreed with the arguments against affirmative action and were subsequently told that the arguments came from the KKK. We also found support for the sacred value protection model's (Tetlock et al., 2000) prediction that people would engage in moral overkill and perceive more racism after engaging in moral outrage. We also found support for the compensatory hypothesis. When participants first disagreed with the arguments and were then told that the arguments came from the KKK, they perceived less racism than participants who agreed with the arguments and were then told that they came from the KKK. Thus, in the conditions where participants disagreed with the arguments—both before and after the source of those arguments was known, we found

support for both the overkill and compensatory hypotheses. When participants knew that arguments came from the KKK at the outset, they engaged in overkill moral reactions and increased their vigilance against racism. Disagreeing with the arguments first without knowing the source may have established participants as nonprejudiced, and they may have been unaffected—and perhaps relieved—when they found out that the arguments came from the KKK. Because the KKK represents an extreme violation of racial equality, people may be especially motivated to rid themselves of racism and thus be more vigilant about perceiving racism.

### **General Discussion**

The purpose of the present research was to investigate whether people perceive hate groups as immoral social agents who evoke moral outrage and how people may react to the morally contaminating influence of hate groups in the U.S. We found support for the hypothesis that hate groups are perceived to be immoral social agents and that they evoke moral outrage among those who value group-based equality. Many hate groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, violate a racial egalitarian ideology, which causes people who desire equal group relations to express moral outrage. Despite their overtly racist and prejudiced missions, hate groups are adapting their propaganda to conform to social norms of racial equality by focusing on ingroup favoritism (e.g., white power) instead of outgroup derogation (e.g., overtly blaming black people for problems in society).

We were interested in the ways that exposure to hate groups may increase people's perceptions of racism in ambiguously racist discourse. We found that participants who were lead to believe that they share compatible beliefs about affirmative action with the Ku Klux Klan perceived more racism in an ambiguously racist mission

statement than participants who were not lead to believe that they share compatible beliefs about affirmative action with the KKK. Participants who expressed moral outrage by disagreeing with the KKK perceived the same level of racism in the mission statement than participants who were motivated to morally cleanse themselves. This latter finding supports the overkill hypothesis proposed by the sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) and does not support the prediction made by the moral credentials model (Monin & Miller, 2001). However, participants who disagreed with the arguments and were then told that they came from the KKK—thereby establishing themselves as nonracist—perceived less racism than participants who were morally contaminated by the KKK, which supports the compensatory hypothesis and moral credentials model. The present study, in all, explored people’s perceptions of and reactions to hate groups in the United States.

### **Overkill or Compensation**

The Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups represent an extremist group in the discourse surrounding race relations in the U.S. Because of this, they are very likely to evoke strong moral reactions among those who value racial equality. When people are confronted with such an extreme moral transgressor, they engage in moral protection processes that may be redundant and appear irrational (i.e., overkill hypothesis; Tetlock et al., 2000). When moral reactions to sacred value violators (e.g., moral outrage and moral cleansing) are relatively easy to do and when the violator is especially intolerable, people seek many opportunities to engage in moral outrage and to morally cleanse, which may include both expressing moral outrage and seeking out ways to morally cleanse oneself. We found evidence of the overkill hypothesis in Experiment 2. Tetlock et al.

(2000) predict that when outrage or cleansing are not easy to do or when the violation is not as serious, people may engage in compensatory actions (e.g., merely expressing moral outrage) that require no further cognitive, affective, or behavioral moral work.

This compensatory hypothesis is the one advocated by Monin and Miller's (2001) moral credentials model. When people establish themselves as moral by fighting against prejudice, they no longer need to "prove" themselves to be non-prejudiced. We found support for this model as well. Typically, this model is tested with a less extreme instance of prejudice than hate groups (e.g., discriminatory hiring between a black or white applicant) where establishing moral credentials can relieve people of the problem of doing something about prejudice. When participants did not know the source and disagreed with the arguments, they may have established themselves as nonracist. Once these participants knew the source of the arguments, it further established them as nonracist because they did not see themselves as similar to the KKK. They then perceived less racism in the mission statement because they had already earned their moral license as nonracist people.

Because hate groups threaten sacred values and can morally contaminate people within a moral community, they evoke strong moral reactions and defensive strategies that do not let people escape as easily from moral transgressions against racial egalitarianism. We suggest that contaminating people with the reality of hate groups—an extreme moral transgressor—in the U.S. may motivate extended action and vigilance against racism in one's environment, which can motivate people to behave in egalitarian ways. Dismissing the influence of overt agents of prejudice can make people less aware of the variety of expressions of prejudice, which can contribute to the idea that prejudice

and discrimination are no longer problems. Revealing the source of hierarchy-enhancing political discourse can motivate people to label that discourse for what it is (e.g., racist, sexist, and so on).

### **After Perceiving Racism**

One of the major deterrents to engaging in prosocial bystander behavior is *not* noticing that something is happening and *not* interpreting it as a problem (Ashburn-Nardo, Morris, Goodwin, 2008; Latane & Darley, 1970). The present experiments suggest that hate groups can be used to get people to realize that racism exists and that it is a problem. The next steps include ensuring that people are responsible for acting against racism and providing people with behavioral skills to actually engage in hierarchy-attenuating behavior. A 2009 Gallup poll showed that 49% of white Americans believe racism against blacks is widespread while 78% of blacks believe racism is widespread (Newport, 2009). Thus, approximately half of white Americans do not believe that racism is a problem, so they may not believe that they could do something to solve a problem that they do not believe even exists.

Making people aware of racism in their environments may provide a contrast to their belief in racial equality. When people believe they have engaged in racist ways, they may be motivated to change the way they respond to be more consistent with their egalitarian beliefs (Monteith & Mark, 2005). Getting people to believe that racism exists is the first hurdle that exposure to hate groups and potentially other blatant forms of racism help to eliminate. By exposing people to their own ideological inconsistencies (e.g., racism and egalitarianism), we can induce cognitive dissonance that may motivate a change in people's prejudiced ways (Monteith & Mark, 2005). Using hate groups or other

extreme instances of racism and prejudice can help to ensure that people cannot just affirm another unrelated aspect of their self (Steele, 1988) but instead must confront racism itself (Tetlock et al., 2000).

Merely educating people about the problems of racism, however, is not enough to motivate vigilance against racism. As we show in Experiment 2, vigilance against racism occurs once people become morally contaminated by hate groups (i.e., there is increased overlap between people's belief systems and hate groups' belief systems). When people distance themselves from racial inequality by rejecting anti-affirmative action arguments first and are then told that the arguments come from a hate group, they become less vigilant to racism than when people do not reject those arguments and are then told that they come from a hate group. This finding suggests that in order to motivate vigilance against racism, people must feel morally contaminated by the problem. They must feel as though they are part of the problem and must therefore confront it. It appears as though when people realize that they are an actor and contributor of a larger systemic problem of hierarchy and oppression, they can be motivated to be vigilant to the problem and perhaps act more in line with egalitarianism and other hierarchy-attenuating ideologies. Future research can extend the model we explored in the present thesis by understanding the hierarchy-attenuating behavioral implications of being vigilant to racism in one's environment (e.g., confronting racist remarks; Ashburn-Nardo, Morris, & Goodwin, 2008).

### **Spatial Moral Contamination**

We predict that people can be morally contaminated in spatial terms in addition to the psychological contamination participants experienced in Experiment 2. By telling

people that hate groups operate in their own communities or that they will come to visit the places that people live their lives (e.g., homes, restaurants, malls, and so on), people may feel morally contaminated, which can induce moral cleansing and moral outrage processes. In order to cleanse a proximal moral contaminant, people may have to physically remove the contaminant. With regard to hate groups living in a community, people may be ideologically required to engage in social activism and work to physically remove hate groups from one's community. Research on collective action (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) can inform how people may engage in collective action to successfully protest against the morally contaminating presence of hate groups in people's communities. Hate groups can provide a strong ideological contrast that motivates people to change their physical ecology in order to follow more directly from their egalitarian ideals. Future research can investigate this hypothesis to see if hate groups can be used to propagate anti-racist and egalitarian group relations.

### **Conclusion**

Even though contemporary research on prejudice suggests that it may be hidden (Henry & Sears, 2002), subtle (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997), or implicit (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), overt forms of prejudice still operate in contemporary society. Focusing on the covert forms of prejudice may distract psychological research from examining the influence of overt forms of prejudice that may still have influence in society. Hate groups, for example, can morally contaminate people when they are aware that they exist, and they can subsequently motivate people to perceive racism in their environments—one of the greatest hurdles to prosocial behavior. The present research explores the contaminating influence of hate groups in the U.S. and seeks to explore how

they can be used to provide an ideological contrast to people's egalitarian beliefs and motivate vigilance against racism.

## References

- Berlet, C., & Vysotsky, S. (2006). Overview of U.S. white supremacist groups. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 34*, 11-48.
- Bushman, B. J. (2002). Does venting anger feed or extinguish the flame? Catharsis, rumination, distraction, anger, and aggressive responding. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*, 724-731.
- Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2004). Aversive racism. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (pp. 1-52). San Diego, CA: Elsevier Academic Press.
- Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., Johnson, C., Johnson, B., & Howard, A. (1997). On the nature of prejudice: Automatic and controlled processes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33*, 510-540.
- Duckitt, J. (1992). Psychology and prejudice: A historical analysis and integrative framework. *American Psychologist, 47*, 1182-1193.
- Edgell, P., Gerteis, J., & Hartmann, D. (2006). Atheists as “other”: Moral boundaries and cultural membership in American society. *American Sociological Review, 71*, 211-234.
- Federico, C. M., & Sidanius, J. (2002). Racism, ideology, and affirmative action revisited: The antecedents and consequences of “principle objections” to affirmative action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*, 488-502.
- Fiske, A. P., & Tetlock, P. E. (1997). Taboo trade-offs: Reactions to transactions that transgress the spheres of justice. *Political Psychology, 18*, 255-297.

- Glaser, J., Dixit, J., & Green, D. P. (2002). Studying hate crime with the internet: What makes racists advocate racial violence? *Journal of Social Issues, 58*, 177-193.
- Goff, P. A., Eberhardt, J. L., Williams, M. J., & Jackson, M. C. (2008). Not yet human: Implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization, and contemporary consequences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94*, 292-306.
- Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 1464-1480.
- Henry, P. J., & Sears, D. O. (2002). The symbolic racism 2000 scale. *Political Psychology, 23*, 253-283.
- Holthouse, D.. (2009). The year in hate: Number of hate groups tops 900. *Intelligence Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=1027>
- Jaccard, J., & Wan, C. K., & Turrisi, R. (1990). The detection and interpretation of interaction effects between continuous variables in multiple regression. *Multivariate Behavioral Research, 25*, 467-478.
- Lane, D. M., & Sandor, A. (2009). Designing better graphs by including distributional information and integrating words, numbers, and images. *Psychological Methods, 14*, 239-257.
- Latane, B., & Darley, J. M. (1970). *The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn't He Help?* New York: Appleton-Century Crofts.
- Leach, C. W. (2005). Against the notion of a 'new racism.' *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 15*, 432-445.

Meertens, R. W., & Pettigrew, T. F. (1997). Is subtle prejudice really prejudice? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *61*, 54-71.

Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*, 33-43.

Monteith, M. J., & Mark, A. Y. (2005). Changing one's prejudiced ways: Awareness, affect, and self regulation. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *16*, 113-154.

Newport, F. (2009, October). Little "Obama effect" on views about race relations.

Retrieved November 9, 2009, from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/123944/Little-Obama-Effect-Views-Race-Relations.aspx>

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *67*, 741-763.

Sachdeva, S., Ilic, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). Sinning saints and saintly sinners: The paradox of moral self-regulation. *Psychological Science*, *20*, 523-528.

Schnall, S., Benton, J., & Harvey, S. (2008). With a clean conscience: Cleanliness reduces the severity of moral judgments. *Psychological Science*, *19*, 1219-1222.

Schafer, J. R., & Navarro, J. (2003, March). The seven-stage hate model: The psychopathology of hate groups. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, *72*, 1-8.

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., & Bobo, L. (1996). Racism, conservatism, affirmative action, and intellectual sophistication: A matter of principled conservatism or group dominance? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *70*, 476-490.

Sniderman, P. M., Piazza, T., Tetlock, P. E., & Kendrick, A. (1991). The new racism.

*American Journal of Political Science*, 35, 423-447.

Southern Poverty Law Center. (2010). *Active U.S. Hate Groups*. Retrieved from

<http://splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map>

Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 21, pp. 261-302). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Lerner, J. S., & Green, M. C. (2000). The psychology of the unthinkable: Taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 78, 853-870.

van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. *Psychological Bulletin*, 134, 504-535.

Watson, D., Clark, L. A., Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54, 1063-1070.

Zhong, C., & Liljenquist, K. (2006). Washing away your sins: Threatened morality and physical cleansing. *Science*, 313, 1451-1452.

Table 1

*List of Groups Rated in Pilot Study on Ratings of How Familiar, Liberal, Conservative, and Racist the Groups were Perceived to Be*

Group Name	Type of Group	Familiarity Ratings	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racism Ratings	Identified Correctly
Accuracy in Media	Conservative	2.36 (1.87) N=66	4.66 (1.67) N=58	3.57 (1.73) N=58	2.44 (1.67) N=59	No
Alliance Defense Fund	Conservative	1.40 (.97) N=67	3.56 (1.48) N=54	4.19 (1.42) N=54	2.39 (1.55) N=54	Yes
American Conservative Union	Conservative	1.62 (1.27) N=65	1.91 (1.44) N=58	6.09 (1.42) N=58	2.75 (1.46) N=57	Yes
American Values Agenda	Conservative	1.38 (1.04) N=67	3.36 (1.58) N=53	4.04 (1.64) N=52	2.62 (1.63) N=52	Yes
Christian Coalition of America	Conservative	2.12 (1.59) N=66	2.72 (1.59) N=57	5.39 (1.46) N=59	2.76 (1.73) N=58	Yes
Citizens for the Republic	Conservative	1.79 (1.49) N=67	3.16 (1.40) N=55	4.29 (1.59) N=56	2.70 (1.59) N=56	Yes

Group Name	Type of Group	Familiarity Ratings	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racism Ratings	Identified Correctly
Council for the Defense of Freedom	Conservative	1.79 (1.46) N=67	4.05 (1.68) N=57	3.95 (1.73) N=57	2.39 (1.58) N=57	No
Democracy Alliance	Conservative	1.94 (1.45) N=66	4.67 (1.72) N=55	3.13 (1.63) N=55	2.04 (1.32) N=55	No
Faith and Family Alliance	Conservative	1.66 (1.23) N=65	2.98 (1.59) N=57	4.67 (1.75) N=57	2.39 (1.37) N=57	Yes
Focus on the Family	Conservative	1.83 (1.49) N=66	3.60 (1.65) N=55	4.45 (1.64) N=55	2.02 (1.38) N=55	Yes
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis	Conservative	1.48 (.93) N=66	3.67 (1.69) N=54	3.57 (1.62) N=54	2.39 (1.50) N=54	No
National Rifle Association	Conservative	3.74 (2.13) N=66	2.90 (1.91) N=60	5.20 (1.79) N=59	2.37 (1.60) N=60	Yes
Republican Party	Conservative	5.37 (1.82) N=67	2.18 (1.45) N=65	6.02 (1.40) N=66	3.22 (1.69) N=65	Yes

Group Name	Type of Group	Familiarity Ratings	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racism Ratings	Identified Correctly
Rightroots	Conservative	1.15 (.71) N=66	3.73 (1.48) N=49	3.65 (1.49) N=49	2.79 (1.62) N=49	No
Young Americans for Freedom	Conservative	1.75 (1.42) N=67	5.26 (1.63) N=53	2.92 (1.45) N=53	2.19 (1.65) N=53	No
20/20 Vision	Liberal	1.53 (1.34) N=66	3.60 (1.77) N=52	3.06 (1.56) N=52	2.37 (1.73) N=52	Yes
Alliance for Democracy	Liberal	2.17 (1.58) N=65	4.80 (1.84) N=60	3.03 (1.68) N=60	1.92 (1.38) N=60	Yes
Democratic Party	Liberal	5.36 (1.65) N=66	6.02 (1.12) N=65	2.14 (1.16) N=65	1.80 (1.35) N=65	Yes
Democratic Socialists of America	Liberal	2.24 (1.46) N=67	5.14 (1.75) N=58	2.66 (1.76) N=58	2.17 (1.43) N=58	Yes
Emily's List	Liberal	1.09 (.62) N=67	3.63 (1.62) N=49	2.98 (1.38) N=49	2.34 (1.51) N=49	Yes

Group Name	Type of Group	Familiarity Ratings	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racism Ratings	Identified Correctly
Institute for America's Future	Liberal	1.44 (.99)	4.43 (1.62)	3.49 (1.58)	2.21 (1.42)	Yes
		N=66	N=53	N=53	N=53	
League of Women Voters	Liberal	2.41 (1.71)	5.46 (1.76)	2.67 (1.79)	1.89 (1.47)	Yes
		N=66	N=61	N=60	N=61	
MoveOn	Liberal	1.24 (.78)	4.06 (1.67)	3.21 (1.51)	2.85 (1.81)	Yes
			N=52	N=52	N=52	
New Beginnings	Liberal	1.39 (1.01)	4.02 (1.67)	3.26 (1.45)	2.27 (1.51)	Yes
		N=66	N=51	N=50	N=51	
Planned Parenthood	Liberal	4.67 (1.96)	5.34 (1.84)	2.70 (1.76)	1.32 (.82)	Yes
		N=66	N=64	N=64	N=63	
Pride Foundation	Liberal	1.56 (1.23)	4.47 (1.77)	3.29 (1.62)	2.36 (1.44)	Yes
		N=66	N=55	N=55	N=55	
Progressive Majority	Liberal	1.51 (1.25)	4.45 (1.59)	3.11 (1.27)	2.98 (1.92)	Yes
		N=67	N=53	N=53	N=53	

Group Name	Type of Group	Familiarity Ratings	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racism Ratings	Identified Correctly
Public Citizen	Liberal	2.00 (1.81) N=66)	3.85 (1.41) N=53	3.53 (1.32) N=53	2.74 (1.42) N=53	Yes
True Majority	Liberal	1.51 (1.25) N=67	3.96 (1.64) N=52	3.52 (1.61) N=52	2.83 (1.78) N=52	Yes
Working for Change	Liberal	1.72 (1.42) N=67	4.80 (1.72) N=54	3.07 (1.61) N=54	2.13 (1.54) N=54	Yes
Aryan Nations	Hate	2.77 (2.08) N=64	2.63 (1.70) N=56	5.00 (1.79) N=56	5.22 (2.04) N=58	Yes
Black Metal	Hate	1.28 (1.07) N=67	3.51 (1.56) N=49	3.37 (1.65) N=49	3.18 (1.85) N=50	No
Christian Identity	Hate	2.51 (2.02) N=67	2.80 (1.79) N=56	5.37 (1.64) N=57	2.89 (1.72) N=57	No
Council of Conservative Citizens	Hate	1.83 (1.30) N=67	1.62 (.99) N=55	6.35 (1.11) N=55	3.04 (1.73) N=54	No

Group Name	Type of Group	Familiarity Ratings	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racism Ratings	Identified Correctly
Creativity Movement	Hate	1.63 (1.29) N=67	4.80 (1.62) N=54	2.87 (1.45) N=54	1.98 (1.39) N=54	No
Hammerskins	Hate	1.14 (.58) N=65	3.33 (1.60) N=48	3.83 (1.64) N=48	3.82 (1.93) N=49	No
Ku Klux Klan	Hate	5.97 (1.40) N=66	2.25 (2.12) N=65	5.19 (2.44) N=64	6.55 (1.55) N=66	Yes
National Alliance	Hate	1.79 (1.41) N=67	3.82 (1.42) N=55	4.00 (1.47) N=54	2.38 (1.46) N=53	No
National Socialist Movement	Hate	2.27 (1.77) N=67	4.76 (1.90) N=59	3.05 (1.86) N=59	2.70 (1.82) N=60	No
Nationalist Coalition	Hate	1.46 (1.11) N=67	3.56 (1.27) N=52	3.62 (1.39) N=52	2.75 (1.63) N=52	No
Skinheads	Hate	3.80 (1.94) N=66	2.55 (1.92) N=62	4.87 (2.12) N=62	6.28 (1.53) N=64	Yes

Group Name	Type of Group	Familiarity Ratings	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racism Ratings	Identified Correctly
Volksfront	Hate	1.12 (.77) N=67	3.44 (1.43) N=48	3.46 (1.41) N=48	2.88 (1.55) N=48	No
White Aryan Resistance (WAR)	Hate	2.40 (2.04) N=67	2.53 (1.72) N=58	4.66 (1.97) N=58	5.40 (2.04) N=60	Yes
White Order of Thule	Hate	1.05 (.21) N=66	2.92 (1.46) N=49	3.96 (1.68) N=49	4.30 (2.14) N=50	Yes
White Revolution	Hate	1.85 (1.31) N=67	2.82 (1.95) N=52	5.00 (1.95) N=55	5.89 (1.53) N=56	Yes

*Note.* Means are presented first with standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 2

*Correlation matrices for Experiment 1 variables overall and by condition*

Overall (N=85)	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. SDO	--			
2. Political Orientation	-.38***	--		
3. Perceptions of Immorality	.29***	-.20 <sup>+</sup>	--	
4. Moral Outrage	.48***	-.32***	.78***	--
KKK Condition (N=29)				
1. SDO	--			
2. Political Orientation	-.33 <sup>+</sup>	--		
3. Perceptions of Immorality	.25 <sup>ns</sup>	-.08 <sup>ns</sup>	--	
4. Moral Outrage	.53**	-.12 <sup>ns</sup>	.81***	--
Republican Party Condition (N=28)				
1. SDO	--			
2. Political Orientation	-.36 <sup>+</sup>	--		
3. Perceptions of Immorality	.27 <sup>ns</sup>	-.28 <sup>ns</sup>	--	
4. Moral Outrage	.47*	-.53**	.57**	--
American Atheists Condition (N=28)				
1. SDO	--			
2. Political Orientation	-.43*	--		
3. Perceptions of Immorality	.28 <sup>ns</sup>	-.23 <sup>ns</sup>	--	
4. Moral Outrage	.46*	-.34 <sup>+</sup>	.83***	--

*Note.* \*\*\* $p < .001$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .05$ . <sup>+</sup> $p < .10$ . <sup>ns</sup> $p > .10$ .

Table 3


*Mean perceptions of racism in the mission statement of the Council for Conservative Citizens by condition (i.e., before-argument, after-argument, and control) and agreement with the arguments against affirmative action.*

	Before- Argument	After- Argument	Control	Totals (N)
Agree	3.86 <sup>a</sup>	4.31 <sup>b</sup>	4.00 <sup>ab</sup>	81
Disagree	4.18 <sup>b</sup>	3.89 <sup>a</sup>	4.06 <sup>ab</sup>	69
Totals (N)	47	51	52	150

*Note.* Means with different letters are significantly different each other ( $p < .05$ ).

Figure 1


*Ratings of immorality, controlling for support for group based equality by the source of the argument against immigration*



*Note.* Range is 1 (*moral*) to 7 (*immoral*).

Figure 2


*Moral outrage, controlling for support for group based equality by the source of the argument against immigration*



*Note.* Range is 1 (low moral outrage) to 7.33 (high moral outrage).

Figure 3

*Perceptions of racism in the mission statement by condition (outrage, contamination, and control) and agreement with the argument*



## Appendix A

*Arguments against immigration to the U.S. used in Experiment 1*

It's about time the U.S. cracked down on illegal immigration. With our country in economic turmoil and the continued threat of terrorism, we can't afford to take any risks with the homeland. Illegals probably brought the Swine Flu to the U.S., which has already killed thousands of people and costs millions of dollars in productivity. With our unemployment rate at 10%, we need to preserve jobs for Americans. Immigrants are costing our country money we can't afford right now, with their dependency on welfare, wanting free educations and medical care, and high costs of bilingual education. Immigrants often come from backward countries that don't understand our traditions of religion and freedom, and there is a real danger of watering down our culture because of too much immigration. It would be nice if the U.S. could be all things to all people, but right now, its time to keep America for the Americans.

## Appendix B

*Arguments against affirmative action used in Experiment 2*

The federal government has enacted programs and laws designed for the exclusive discrimination against those of White European ancestry. Promotions, hiring and scholarships should be based on ability and not upon a person's race. Affirmative action is a growing source of economical inequality for Caucasians especially considering that in the current United States economic recession such a policy disenfranchises a growing number of unemployed Caucasians who have to wait last in line for any sense of being employed because of non-Caucasians who get jobs before them.

Appendix C

*Means and standard deviations from ratings of the parts of the mission statement from the Council for Conservative Citizens. Parts 2, 6, and 12 of the Mission Statement were selected to be used in Experiment 2.*

Text from Mission Statement	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racist Ratings
<p><b>2. We believe the United States is a European country and that Americans are part of the European people.</b> We believe that the United States derives from and is an integral part of European civilization and the European people and that the American people and government should remain European in their composition and character. We therefore oppose the massive immigration of non-European and non-Western peoples into the United States that threatens to transform our nation into a non-European majority in our lifetime. We believe that illegal immigration must be stopped, if necessary by military force and placing troops on our national borders; that illegal aliens must be returned to their own countries; and that legal immigration must be severely restricted or halted through appropriate changes in our laws and policies. We also oppose all efforts to mix the races of mankind, to promote non-white races over the European-American people through so-called “affirmative action” and similar measures, to destroy or denigrate the European-American heritage, including the heritage of the Southern people, and to force the integration of the races.</p>	2.63 (1.78) N=67	4.96 (1.93) N=67	5.10 (1.99) N=67
<p><b>6. The traditional family is the basic unit of human society.</b> We believe in the traditional family as the basic unit of human society and morality, and we oppose all efforts by the state and other powers to weaken the structure of the American family through toleration of sexual licentiousness, homosexuality and other perversions, mixture of the races, pornography in all forms, and subversion of the authority of parents.</p>	2.52 (1.84) N=67	5.40 (1.93) N=67	3.85 (2.21) N=66

Text from Mission Statement

	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racist Ratings
<p><b>12. Traditional Education under Local Control.</b> We believe that education is primarily the concern of parents and families and local communities and therefore we oppose federal aid to education and federal efforts to control or direct education. We believe that education should inform and build the mind and character, not brainwash children with political propaganda or “liberate” them from the traditional values and loyalties their families have taught them. We therefore oppose all “sex education” as well as so-called “multiculturalist” and “Afrocentric” curricula, “Outcome-Based Education,” and similar radical indoctrination in the schools. We oppose all efforts to inflate grades, adulterate or “dumb down” tests and examinations, and introduce irrelevant and wasteful courses for the purpose of advancing some backward students over others more talented or more productive. We believe the schools, public, private, and parochial, should teach students to be proud of being Americans and proud of their national and local identities, and that they should instill in them the values of Western, Christian, and American civilization. We support the authority of teachers and school administrators to discipline students, including the authority to expel them from school if students will not abide by the rules and laws of the community. We support the right of parents to send their children to private schools or to educate their children at home if they so desire, without government intrusion or control. We support the right of private schools to select their own students, faculty, curricula, standards, and methods of administration.</p>	2.67 (1.94) N=67	5.57 (1.66) N=67	3.03 (1.95) N=66
<p><b>1. We believe the United States is a Christian country.</b> We believe that the United States of America is a Christian country, that its people are a Christian people, and that its government and public leaders at all levels must reflect Christian beliefs and values. We therefore oppose all efforts to deny or weaken the Christian heritage of the United States, including the unconstitutional prohibitions of prayers and other religious expression in schools and other public institutions.</p>	2.30 (1.78) N=67	5.49 (1.88) N=67	3.15 (2.18) N=67

Text from Mission Statement

	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racist Ratings
<b>3. The United States is a sovereign and independent nation.</b> We believe the United States is a sovereign and independent nation, that our independence as a nation is the most precious legacy of our Founding Fathers, and that all treaties, agreements, conventions, international organizations, and institutions must recognize and respect our national sovereignty and independence. We therefore oppose the so-called “New World Order” and its attempts to abolish national sovereignty and independence and to construct a one-world state in which America would vanish and Americans would be enslaved. We call for the U.S. government to withdraw from membership in the United Nations, the World Court, the International Monetary Fund, NAFTA, and the World Trade Organization. We oppose any attempt to place American military personnel under foreign command. We oppose any effort to place Americans, military or civilian, on trial before, or subject them to legal punishments by, international courts or organizations. We oppose, and we support official U.S. renunciation of, any treaty, agreement, or convention that seeks to dictate law to the United States or any state, that violates national sovereignty, or denies or violates the constitutional rights of Americans.	4.03 (1.90) N=67	4.32 (1.88) N=66	2.38 (1.65) N=66

Text from Mission Statement

	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racist Ratings
<b>4. The United States is a constitutional republic.</b> We believe the United States is a constitutional republic, governed by law and by the original intent of the United States Constitution and of the men who framed it. We believe the Constitution can be changed only by the proper procedure of amendment or constitutional convention and not by court decision, popular majority, political whim, or legislative fiat. We therefore oppose the “imperial judiciary” in the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal courts that has usurped more and more power to itself in the last century and has imposed on our country the most odious and harmful rulings. We reject the legitimacy and constitutionality of the rulings handed down by the imperial judiciary; we support the appointment of judges and justices who are qualified to interpret the Constitution and the laws and are committed to their proper interpretation; and we support the impeachment of judges and justices who usurp or claim powers not granted them by the Constitution. We also oppose the “imperial bureaucracy” that imposes unconstitutional administrative decrees in such fields as business, agriculture, labor, and education that tyrannically interfere with personal liberty and dignity, private property, the sanctity of the family, and ethical conduct. We support the abolition of those government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels that have no constitutional foundation, including the U.S. Departments of Education, Housing and Urban Development, Energy, Health and Human Services, and similar agencies. We support the separation of powers that is a fundamental principle of the U.S. Constitution and of basic human liberty. We support the restoration of the constitutionally proper balance among the three branches of the federal government and the reduction of their powers, size, personnel, and costs to the limits intended by the Constitution.	3.52 (1.78) N=67	5.24 (1.44) N=67	1.95 (1.33) N=66

Text from Mission Statement

	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racist Ratings
<b>5. We believe in States' Rights, the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, and the Bill of Rights.</b>	3.52	5.13 (1.68)	2.05
We believe in states' rights, as guaranteed by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution; in the individual right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the Constitution; and in all the rights and liberties guaranteed by the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. We therefore oppose all efforts by the federal government to dictate to the states and local governments and communities, and we oppose federal efforts to engineer or impose behavior and beliefs on citizens and communities. We oppose "gun control" in all forms and demand that all such legislation and policies be repealed. We also oppose all such legislation as so-called "hate crime" or "bias crime" laws. Such laws merely penalize thought and expression rather than genuinely criminal action and are a dangerous and frightening step toward government Thought Control. Similarly, we oppose all so-called "politically correct" speech codes and "sensitivity training" in schools, colleges, universities, and businesses that punish free expression, restrict thought and study, intimidate dissent, and generally demean and diminish human communications and community. We also oppose, as stated, all efforts to deny Americans their rights of religious expression and worship as guaranteed in the First Amendment, as well as efforts to deny rights of assembly and association.	(2.03) N=65	N=67	(1.55) N=66

Text from Mission Statement

	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racist Ratings
<b>7. Private property and free enterprise are the foundations of our economy.</b> We believe in private property and free enterprise as the foundations of our economic life and the basis of American wealth. We oppose efforts by the state to regulate, plan, manage, control, or nationalize private property in any form. We oppose the ruinous taxation that government has imposed on working Americans and we call for real tax reform that will allow working men and women to retain what they have earned. We support the repeal of the estate tax. We affirm that the best economic decision-maker is the individual acting in what he believes is his own best interest. We believe that tax policies and other economic legislation and policies should reflect the importance of small businessmen, the family farm, and other independent, locally and privately owned and operated enterprises. While we accept the need for some public welfare, health care, unemployment, and old age assistance, we believe in such programs only as a last resort for those who truly need them. We believe tax laws should encourage private charity rather than public support for the poor, the disabled, and the sick and elderly who are unable to care for themselves. We support welfare programs that seek to return recipients of welfare to productive work as soon as possible. We oppose all welfare for immigrants, whether legal or illegal.	3.48 (2.00) N=67	4.93 (1.90) N=67	2.88 (1.81) N=67
<b>8. Cultural, national, and racial integrity.</b> We support the cultural and national heritage of the United States and the race and civilization of which it is a part, as well as the expression and celebration of the legitimate subcultures and ethnic and regional identities of our people. We oppose all efforts to discredit, “debunk,” denigrate, ridicule, subvert, or express disrespect for that heritage. We believe public monuments and symbols should reflect the real heritage of our people, and not a politically convenient, inaccurate, insulting, or fictitious heritage.	4.43 (1.92) N=67	3.82 (1.84) N=67	1.90 (1.40) N=67
<b>9. A Strong National Defense.</b> We believe in the strongest possible defense for the United States. We oppose the presence of homosexuals and women in the military services and especially of women in combat roles.	2.18 (1.81) N=66	6.23 (1.41) N=66	3.22 (2.30) N=65

Text from Mission Statement

	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racist Ratings
<b>10. America First Foreign Policy.</b> We believe that in the aftermath of the U.S. victory over Soviet Communism, the United States has little need to retain the political and military commitments to allies made during the Cold War. While we wish these allies well, we believe we cannot continue to support their defense budgets, guarantee their security, fight their wars, or finance their governments and economies through foreign aid. We therefore call for a comprehensive review of all U.S. diplomatic commitments and U.S. withdrawal from those alliances and commitments that no longer serve our national interests or that threaten to entangle us in unnecessary foreign wars, conflicts, and quarrels. We therefore oppose continued membership in NATO and similar outdated Cold War alliances; we oppose sending American troops on U.N. peace-keeping missions or into similar unconstitutionally undeclared wars under the names of “police actions.” We oppose sending American military personnel into wars and conflicts that do not concern our national security and interests. We oppose ever sending American military men into combat without the intention to achieve victory. We oppose using American prisoners of war as diplomatic “bargaining chips” under any circumstances, and we oppose abandoning American POWs to merciless enemies after the cessation of conflict to suit the political interests of office-holders. We oppose all foreign aid and call for its termination. We support the investigation of lobbying groups that represent the interests of foreign states or foreign powers and the enactment of legislation that will outlaw lobbying Congress or the executive branch on behalf of foreign states.	4.22 (1.80) N=67	4.07 (1.90) N=67	2.53 (1.70) N=66
<b>11. America First Trade Policy.</b> We believe that just as our nation has legitimate international political and military interests, so it also has a legitimate international economic interest. We believe our trade policy should reflect our national economic interest and that the protection of our economy, including the jobs of our workers, our farms, and our manufacturing industries, is a vitally necessary duty of our national government.	4.06 (1.80) N=66	4.07 (1.90) N=66	2.53 (1.70) N=66

Text from Mission Statement	Liberal Ratings	Conservative Ratings	Racist Ratings
<p><b>13. Strong and Just Law Enforcement.</b> We believe in the moral and legal responsibility of the individual and therefore that good behavior should be rewarded and bad behavior should be punished. We believe the most effective and most just response to crime is swift, certain, and morally appropriate punishment. We believe in capital punishment for the crimes of murder, rape, treason, and espionage. We oppose the substitution of the pseudo-sciences of psychiatry, sociology, and “rehabilitation” for real justice. We believe law enforcement should be mainly a function of local and state government, and we therefore oppose all efforts to establish a national police force or to nationalize law enforcement; we oppose similar efforts to create a global or international police force and to “globalize” law enforcement. We oppose the extradition of law-abiding American citizens to trials before foreign courts under laws to which they have never assented. We oppose all international criminal tribunals and all efforts to diminish national sovereignty through the internationalization of criminal law. While we support and deeply respect all law enforcement officers, we also insist that law enforcement at all levels operate within the law, that law enforcement respect the rights of all citizens, and that spying on and harassment of loyal and law-abiding citizens by law enforcement agencies, by the military services, or by intelligence services at any level of government should be strictly forbidden and severely punished.</p>	3.40 (1.92) N=67	5.13 (1.77) N=67	1.89 (1.49) N=66
<p><b>14. Protection of the Environment and Natural Heritage.</b> We believe that the natural environment and resources of a nation are among its most precious, valuable, and irreplaceable treasures. We believe in the protection of the environment from reckless greed as well as from irresponsible government. We support the protection of truly endangered species of wildlife and areas of natural beauty.</p>	5.24 (1.64) N=67	3.52 (1.84) N=67	1.42 (1.16) N=67

*Note.* Means are presented first with standard deviations in parentheses.

## Appendix C

*Adapted items from the symbolic racism 2000 scale (Henry & Sears, 2002) to measure how racist participants thought the organization was.*

*Instructions.* What is your impression of this organization? How does this organization think? Please fill out the questions below as a member of the organization—NOT YOUR OWN VIEWS. Now, we would like to know your opinions of the group whose mission statement you just read.

Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven't pushed fast enough. What does this organization think about this? (Reverse Coded)

Trying to push very much too fast      Moving at about the right speed      Going too Slowly

How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today does this organization think blacks are responsible for creating? (Reverse Coded)

All of it      Most      Some      Not much at all

How much discrimination against blacks does this organization feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?

A lot      Some      Just a little      None at all

This organization believes that generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (Reverse Coded)

Strongly Disagree      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Strongly Agree

This organization believes that over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (Reverse Coded)

Strongly Disagree      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Strongly Agree

This organization believes that over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.

Strongly Disagree      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Strongly Agree