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Delegitimizing Sultanistic Regimes, One Step At a Time

Joshua Thomas
University of Connecticut - Storrs, joshua.thomas@uconn.edu

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Abstract: Sultanistic regimes can be classified as a government structure that blends authoritarianism and democracy. Sultans use democratic institutions—political parties, elections, and general assemblies—to advance their personal policies over their citizens' interests. This results in oppression of citizens. The Libyan Civil War of 2011 serves as a paradigmatic case that illustrates three conditions that help citizens destabilize this type of regime. I explored these conditions and their sequence to illustrate how sultanistic regimes can be overthrown. I conclude that the mixture of international assistance, military support, and civil society groups create the opportunity for a successful revolution.

Joshua D. Thomas
Honors Thesis
Introduction

The Arab Spring revolution resulted in the removal of President Ben Ali of Tunisia, President Mubarak of Egypt, and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. These men can be classified as "modern sultans" who used formal institutions to exercise their personal power over their country. According to the academic literature regarding the Arab Spring, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were all impacted by a number of international and domestic dynamics. A myriad of factors assisted citizens in overthrowing these sultans and their sultanistic government: international assistance, civil society groups, social media, military support, and the like. Yet, the existing literature does not question nor explain if those dynamics or factors have a sequential significance that aid either a revolution or a social movement. As I aim to answer this question, I use the Libyan Civil War as my case study to explain how these regimes can be destabilized.

To reveal how sultanistic regimes are overthrown, I first give a more comprehensive description of sultanistic regimes, as they are dissimilar to traditional government. Secondly, I classify Libya as a sultanistic regime and explain its constitutional form—the Arab Jamahiriya—to highlight the relevance of the case. Thirdly, I describe factors that assisted Libya in their uprising; civil-society groups, military support, and international assistance. Fourthly, I outline the major events that took place during the civil war, so as to highlight the significance and sequence of each variable. Then I discuss why the sequence of factors were not significant in Libya's success and why the mixture of international assistance, military support, and civil society groups create the opportunity for a successful revolution. Finally, with my results, I evaluate the Syrian Civil War and describe the rationale for their stagnancy.

Defining Sultantistic Regimes

Sultanistic regimes is a recently employed term that scholars use to characterize leaders who use formal institutions to administer their personal power over their country. By formal institutions, I have in mind constitutionally recognized institutions that allow citizens to engage in politics. Examples include political parties, general assemblies, congresses, and elections.

Jack Goldstone mentions that the two goals of modern sultans are to exercise their arbitrary power, to accomplish their personal goals, and to keep the masses depoliticized by controlling elections and political parties (2011A). Dictators, says Goldstone, usually buy support from groups. Dictators can micromanage everyday government affairs by rewarding individuals who are loyal to the regime with commercial contracts or other special incentives; corruption thereby enters the government.

Sultans, in addition, often have distinct character traits. They claim to be great thinkers, invent titles for themselves, and write books filled with their ideology (Chehabi and Linz, 1998). Their regimes are highly personalisic as they try to engrave their name in governmental affairs.[i] Believing that their governing style is best, sultans try to legitimize their regime and create a manipulative ideology that positions them self to have absolute power over others (Chehabi and Linz, 1998).

In addition, sultans have family members, usually sons, in line to replace them. In theory, family members will continue the legacy and the sultan's regime. According to scholars, other common qualities of sultans include dishonesty, limited education, and their leadership arising from coincidental channels (chance) (Chehabi and Linz, 1998). In other words, no formal leader originally appointed the sultan leader, and there was no formal process leading to his election. The acceptance of the sultan position happened

accidentally, and was not preplanned. For example, the leadership position may have been vacant, and an individual seized the initiative. The country did not choose him to be the leader. Therefore, citizens initially do not trust the sultan and want him ousted.

Citizens often do not value these sultanistic traits. From this, I perceive that citizens usually feel oppressed under a sultanistic regime, and for that reason, Tunisians, Egyptians, and Libyans overthrew not only their leaders, but their national political systems as well.

Currently, sultanistic regimes are common in the Middle East. The governments allow citizens to participate in elections or congress, yet a sultan rules over the people. Sultanistic dictators manipulate any or all of the democratic institutions and processes, including voting, peaceful protest, and assemblies. They thereby control public policy. As a result, citizens as they participate in the democratic facade, sometimes become politically passive and idle.

Farid Guliyev has summarized Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's influential descriptions of sultanistic regime traits and has listed ten defining features.   Because some of these traits overlap, I have reduced them to four general traits. First, there is a "fusion of the private and the public" (Gulyiev, 2005, p. 410). That is, the government influences both the private and public organizations such as creating government-incentives to retain loyalty to the regime. These organizations regulate private companies and control the price of gas, food, and other staple items. The regime does not distinguish between the private and public sector. Corruption easily occurs, and dictators embezzle money for themselves.

Second, in sultantistic regimes, families are powerful, and there is dynastic succession (Gulyiev, 2005, p. 410). A dictator, his nuclear family, and extended family hold key leadership positions in the government, and usually have been in power for at least a generation. The dictator, wishing to continue his legacy usually has male descendants in line ready to accept his position when he deceases. The extended family, or clans, would be used in governmental affairs, for clan voting, which is simply voting the same way in groups (Gulyiev, 2005, p. 411). Major decision-making is affected by concerns regarding the family in power's interest.

Third, the government system embraces a highly personal pseudoideology (Gulyiev, 2005, p. 410). It is pseudo because its democratic claims are not genuine. Instead, the executive leader is corrupting democratic institutions for his self-interest. Nominal democracy is permitted because it offers a channel for sultans to manage subjects and to impose their personal politics on society. As Larry Diamond et al. (2002) put it, "the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination." The government officials serve the sultan's interest rather than the broader interests of the state (Linz and Stepan, 1996). In short, the broader interest of the state represents the political, economic, and social aspirations of the citizens. Sultans will disregard their aspirations if they do not reflect his own.

Fourth, there is a system of "rewards and fear" that buttresses unrestrained personal rulership (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 260).[ii] The dictator pays off those he favors and makes public spectacles of protesters to instill fear in the public. The dictator issues

threats to the opposition via television or in speeches, and will accuse the opposition of being anti-government or a terrorist organization motivated to corrupt the country.

In Guilyev's opinion, countries with a sultanistic regime may not possess all of the traits Linz and Stepan mention, because of the "grayness" of this governmental system. Guilyev (2005) states that there is no such thing as a pure sultanistic regime because no country can have both a pure authoritarian and a pure democratic system simultaneously (p. 396). The mission of authoritarianism is to oppress personal liberties, where democracy exists to encourage personal liberties. Since authoritarianism is the opposite of democracy, it is logically impossible for these regimes to coexist. The different mixtures produce different public policies. Moreover, the combination of both regime types gives sultans choices on how to carry out sultanism. Some can use political parties to corrupt democracies, and some can use congresses.

In other words, all sultanistic regimes pursue the same goal (to maximize personal leadership), but they do so in different ways. Some leaders use multiparty systems, others use national assemblies. Thomas Carothers identifies two gray-zone categories that he calls feckless pluralism and dominant-power politics. In feckless pluralism, political freedom is bountiful, but the politics are corrupt; and people therefore are dissatisfied with the political system. The major-party officials running for office are deceitful and selfish. In dominant-power politics, "one political grouping dominates the system in such a way that there appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the foreseeable future," and the state's assets are controlled by the ruling political party (Carothers, 2002, p. 12).

Houchang Chehabi and Linz in their study emphasize the unchecked discretionary power of sultanistic rulers. Such rulers use laws to repress citizens who try to oppose the ruler's power. Rulers also use informal groups of thugs to threaten, assault, and even murder citizens (Chehabi and Linz, 1998). These informal groups often have close relations to the sultan, view themselves as representatives of the common good, and recall a past revolution or civil war that liberated citizens. According to Chehabi and Linz, the sultan often heads the informal group, and orders it to harm citizens who oppose the regime. The group generally includes cronies, army officials, and zealots who believe that the sultan can solve the country's problems, and that anyone who defies the sultan is an enemy of the state. No personal sense of shame prohibits the group from attacking peaceful protesters, invading homes, policing streets, or disrupting assemblies.

Allegedly, sultanistic regimes are a "kleptocratic state." The political system operates through its control over essential services, monopoly ownership of critical commodities, kickbacks on contracts, and confiscation of property without compensation (Chehabi and Linz, 1998). The sultan can "allocate public funds to private enterprises linked with himself or his cronies and can eliminate from the market competitors not ready to abide by his demands" (Chehabi and Linz, 1998). These government controlled businesses often involved in diamonds, oil, copper, sugarcane, as well as any other natural resources found within the country. This kleptocratic interpretation of sultanistic orders resembles Stepan's and Linz's idea of a "fusion of the private and the public," in which sultans control both realms.

Chehabi and Linz (1998) contend that sultanism involves a constitutional hypocrisy. The sultanistic ruler acts as though he is the highest authority, but according

to the constitution, he does not have legal authority over all government affairs. The ruler sways potential opponents on policy decisions, and uses formal institutions to confirm the policies. Through such means, the sultan directly controls domestic and foreign affairs. Meanwhile, the sultan and the government display a facade of cooperation before the citizens. The citizens accept this illusion and live as if it is true. Meanwhile, the will of the people is not represented in the policy-making process, unless the citizens' wishes and the sultan's coincide. The sultan's lack of respect for the constitution is revealed in the arbitrariness in which he runs his regime.

Libya as a Sultanistic Regime

Libya's previous government is an example of sultanism. The government's official name was the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Colonel Gaddafi wrote the *Green Book,* which explained the government system. The book presents a complimentary and flattering picture of a balanced and democratic governmental system (see Figure 1). [iii] Gaddafi uses a wheel diagram to convey the relationship between the General Popular Congress (Libyan mass), the Elected People's Committee, and the Secretariat of the Congress. The outer wheel is the General Popular Congress. In theory, at this level, local politics were discussed. In principle, all Libyans (men and women) were able to attend and participate in the General Popular Congress. The middle wheel symbolizes the Elected People's Committee, to which members of the General Popular Congress are elected. The numerous committees of the Elected People's Committee oversaw different aspects of Libya's public affairs: education, agriculture, health and housing.

Lastly, there is the inner wheel, the Secretariat of the Congress, which is the smallest body. One member from each General Popular Congress sector and one from each of the Elected People's Committees constitute the secretariat. Each member of the secretariat holds the title of General Secretariat. Among the General Secretariats, there is a Secretary General. The group's duties include legislating national law and overseeing foreign affairs. The Secretary General has a range of executive powers as well.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE PEOPLE

KEY:

General Secretariat of the General People's Congress

General People's Committee

Secretariat of the Congress

People's Committee of Different Executive Sectors (Agriculture, Education, Health, Housing, etc.)

Syndicate or Association or Union

Figure 1

The various congresses in the diagram suggest that Libyans exercised real influence by means of assemblies and elections. However, Libyan citizens received neither representational benefits from the democratic system, nor rights and freedoms to speak out against the government. People would be punished for ridiculing the regime. Statistics from 2000 show that less than 10% of all citizens regularly attended congressional meetings, and over 70% of people did not believe that they could influence political decisions (Joffe, 2011, p. 522). Meanwhile, Muammar Gaddafi gave himself the title "Leader of the Revolution" and created the Revolutionary Committee, which served as his henchmen. Under Gaddafi's orders, members of the Revolutionary Committee would seize and discipline those who opposed the ideals of the revolution. Disciplinary actions included in public hangings. In fact, Gaddafi used the Revolutionary Committee to bomb hospitals that housed rebels. Many targets of the Revolutionary Committee were affiliated with the National Transitional Council, an opposition group that sought to represent all Libyans who opposed Gaddafi. These oppressions contributed to the Libyan Revolution of 2011.

As mentioned before, Guilyev believes that there is not one prototype of sultantistic regimes. The mixture of democracy and authoritarianism make these regimes very gray. The rulers freely manipulate the formal institutions in their democracy for their personal desires. In addition, the sultan's alliance influences the citizens that participate in the formal institutions. Therefore there can be many subtypes of sultanistic regimes depending on the context of a nation. Since these types of regimes evolved from other regimes, there are various possibilities as to how a sultan will run their own sultanitic regime, especially since the regimes are based on the sultan's personalism. The

type of regime that transitioned to sultanism can influence how the sultan manipulates the democratic institution. For instance, if a country formerly had a multiparty system, then the sultan can create a party that would act as a major party and would advance the progress the sultan's interests.

Given the information regarding sultanistic regimes and Libya's regime preceding the revolution, we can conclude that Libya was a sultanisitc regime. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi served as the sultan and ran a sultanistic government. Gaddafi led a coup against King Idris and overthrew his aristocracy in 1969. The state then had no leader. Gaddafi having led a coup and having been a member in the Libyan Army argued, that except for himself, qualified leaders were not available. Gaddafi created the government Arab Jamahriyah, which allowed citizens to participate in general assemblies, and reigned in power for 42 years. Gaddafi used the general assemblies as a democratic façade and used the Revolutionary Committee as a tool to bully his people into supporting his personal politics. He suppressed protests and committed human violation rights against Libyans. Under his rule, Libya acquired characteristics that fit the notion of sultanistic regimes that Goldstone, Ganji, Guilyev, Jofe, Chebai, Linz, Carothers, and Stepan have developed.

Theory

For sultanistic regimes to be delegitimized, there are specific factors that need to be present. Furthermore, the sequence of these factors is also important because each factor could have caused the next to occur, and resulted in the success of the Libyan Civil War. For instance, international assistance could have caused the civil society groups to collaborate, which could have caused military support. Viewing the Libyan Civil War, it appears that there were significant points in which each factor occurred, and

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consequently other factors followed. I believe that the factors coincidentally happened in a specific order, and coincidentally helped Libya successfully revolt.

To find the sequence of these factors, I will analyze the Libyan Civil War timeline and determine, based on news reports and journal articles, which mechanisms occurred first, second, and third. I recognize that the mechanisms may reoccur, that is to say, international assistance may be given to the citizens more than once, but I am examining when the mechanism first occurred.

In order for citizens to destabilize the Arab Jamahiriya, Libyans needed civil society groups, military aid, and international assistance to occur in that sequence. Strikes and protests initiated by the masses were first necessary to draw attention from the regime to themselves. The people rallying against the regime needed to encompass the same purpose—change of policy—but they also needed to represent different sectors of society. This would then produce a cohort of people who think differently and have different values. In general, the poor and the rich, men and women, or even blue-collard and white-collard workers would benefit differently on certain policies. A diverse group within the opposition is beneficial for a revolution because it keeps the regime accountable to all people and decreases the likelihood of government corruption continuing. For instance, the regime cannot placate or favor everyone because of the lack of resources, therefore those who are not favored or placated can protest (or cause an uproar). The unfavored group can collaborate, protest and fight against the regime and its forces.

Military support must follow the civil society groups' demonstrations because the regime will then be vulnerable. The regime will attempt to end the demonstrations, but if

the military decides not to listen to orders and/or defects from the regime, regime will be weakened and the rebels will be empowered.

International assistance is the last mechanism that needs to occur because the international actors need to see that the rebels desire a revolution, they are organized and there is a responsible contact group that can distribute the tangible aid. International organizations and nations can support the opposition in various facets. Politically, the international community can publicly announce that the sultan needs to resign, or they can announce their support for the opposition group. Furthermore they can send troops and weapons to empower the opposition.

To assess civil-society groups, I will recognize the congregation of multiple groups forming together to create one major opposition. In the case of Libya, I will examine when the National Transitional Council was established, when groups joined their efforts, and their actions that advanced the revolution.

To measure military assistance, I will recognize military attitudes and military actions toward the resistance. For instance, if the military was sympathetic then they could have allowed them to protest by stepping back when people were marching, defect from the military, or join the opposition forces in their fight against Gaddafi. In contrast, if the military were hostile toward the rebels, then they could have prevented people from carrying on demonstrations and suppressed civilians with brute force. I will ascertain when members from the Libyan Army and other law enforcement defected and joined the NTC.

To measure international assistance, I will recognize three types of aid: public declarations, dispatch of troops or tangible aid, and international meetings discussing the process of the revolution.

Mechanisms Used to Delegitimize Sultanistic Regimes

The literature on the Libyan Civil War and the Arab Spring repeatedly mentions civil-society groups, international assistance, military support, and social media as factors that affected the course of events. Since Libya can be classified as a sultanistic regime, these factors merit examination.

Libyan Civil War Timeline

To appreciate the impact of these factors, one first must become familiar with the timeline of the Libyan Civil War. On February 15, 2011 protesters in Benghazi surrounded police stations after Fat'hi Tarbel, a human rights lawyer, was arrested for campaigning for the release of political prisoners. Much larger demonstrations took place two days later in Ajdabiya, Benghazi, Darnah, Zintan, and other Libyan towns; Gaddafi forces, the Libyan Army, Revolution Committee, among others, used live ammunition to kill protesters (Al Jazeera, May 2011). The demonstrations in cities across Libya were evidence of growing resentment against the government. The International Criminal Court even warranted Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and his brother-in-law Abdullah al-Sanussi, "for crimes against humanity," including murders, between February 15 and "at least" February 28" (CNN, 2011). In response to this upheaval, France immediately supplied civilians in Libya with medical aid and weaponry to assist those rebelling against the regime.

On February 20th rebels with rifles, homemade bombs, machetes, rocket launchers, and other weapons seized the city of Benghazi; hundreds of them were killed in battle (Al Jazeera, November 2011). Many countries called on Gaddafi to resign. As Libyans rebelled against Gaddafi, the National Transitional Council formed to be the official representation for the February demonstrators. Many civil society groups— Libyan Army members, government officials, young men and women, teachers, lawyers and Libyans from various ethnic tribes—joined the NTC and their efforts against Gaddafi.

In March, the United Nations Security Council, wishing to protect citizens, mandated a no-fly zone over Libya to protect them; NATO launched airstrikes that targeted Gaddafi's bases and his militia (BBC News, 2013). NATO helped the rebels seize cities and combat Gaddafi's armed forces, and put the rebels on a similar playing field as Gaddafi forces, comprising of mercenaries and bribed Libyan prisoners. The NTC requested that NATO launch more strikes despite the mistaken killing of innocent civilians. The war between civilians and Gaddafi forces continued. Thousands were wounded on both sides, but each day the opposition grew greater in number and captured more cities in pursuit of Gaddafi. Just as internal assistance increased from military defectors, international assistance from other powerful organizations and countries with resources increased as well.

In April, as Gaddafi grew tired of NATO and its airstrikes, he attempted to deter international focus through a written plea. In a letter to President Obama, Gaddafi stated that America and the international community were supporting terrorists and members of al-Qaeda. He claimed that this was an "unjust war against a small people of a developing

country," and that the international coalition was seizing this conflict as an opportunity to overtake Libya's oil production (CNN, 2011). Neither President Obama nor NATO halted the airstrikes. More international assistance occurred this month as Britain provided flak jackets (similar to bullet proof vests) to the opposition, and the Contact Group on Libya, a cohort of countries and international organizations who wished Gaddafi to resign, met for the first time to discuss ways to assist the NTC (Black, 2011).

In late April, Gaddafi's youngest son, Saif al-Arab Gaddafi, was killed. Meanwhile, the NTC prepared to seize the seaside city Misrata. Chivers, in the *New York Times,* reported, "Military forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi have been firing into residential neighborhoods in this embattled city with heavy weapons, including cluster bombs that have been banned by much of the world and ground-to-ground rockets, according to witnesses and survivors, as well as physical evidence" (2011, p. A1).

On May 15th the rebels seized control of the airport and the port area, and Gaddafi forces fled (Al Jazeera, May 2011). A significant number of high ranked officials defected from the Libyan Army and joined the NTC's New Libyan Army because of the inhumane orders they received. They were ordered to retaliate by harming civilians. By June many countries, including Spain and Germany, recognized the National Transitional Council as the legitimate government of Libya.

In August, the rebels surrounded Tripoli and cut off the entrances to and from the city. The rebels captured more villages and moved westward towards Sirte and Tripoli. In September the United Nations General Assembly officially recognized the National Transitional Council as the interim government of Libya (Al Jazeera, November 2011). On October 13th the NTC claimed to control the town Sirte, where Gaddafi forces

resided. Seven days later Muammar Gaddafi was assassinated in his hometown by the

NTC. The NTC won the war; the Libyan Revolution had succeeded; and Libyans moved

toward a more stable and less corrupt government.

Civil-Society Groups: Cross-class coalitions and tribes

Civil-society groups—or groups of people with both similar and dissimilar lifestyles,

began to revolt against Gaddafi and his regime in February 2011. Jack Goldstone, Alia

Brahimi, and Wolfram Lacher contend that these civil society groups were necessary for

Libya's success. The diverse groups collaborated and revolted against Gaddafi and

thereby created many opportunities for the opposition to counter his regime. Yet each

scholar presents and argues the importance of this factor differently.

Goldstone refers to cross-class coalitions. He (2011A) recognizes the initial

protest by lawyers in Benghazi, and mentions that teachers, students, oil workers, and

defectors from the Libyan Army also joined the opposition forces. He contends that the

rebels who brought fighting skills to the opposition—Islamists who were jihadis in

Afghanistan and members from the western Berber tribe—played significant roles in the

resistance (Goldstone, 2011B). In April 2011 the Libyan Revolution was at a stalemate,

but the western Berber tribe captured key cities in the west, and the stalemate was

broken. Islamists and members from the western Berber tribe illustrate how different

classes added to the coalition and contributed their expertise in combat.

Lacher and Brahimi also acknowledge the importance of cross-class coalitions.

Both scholars consider tribal participation in the National Transitional Council to have

made a significant contribution to the victory of the insurgents. Many elites later became

leaders in the NTC. Descendants from the aristocratic bourgeois families who were part

of the former monarch along with defectors from the former regime, held leadership roles in the NTC (Lacher, 2011). Even officials from Gaddafi's regime—the chief of staff, ambassadors, and other officials who helped him lead the coup in 1969—joined the opposition, as did tribes from the northeast region of Libya.

Lacher recognizes the role of university professors, lawyers, and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, but focuses on the power of the tribes in bringing down the regime. Tribes like Berber, Zuwayya, and Toubou revoked their loyalty to the regime and threatened to stop oil production (Lacher, 2011). As a result, the regime began to disintegrate because elites (from tribes and Gaddafi's administration) began to turn on him and join the resistance.

Brahimi, like Lacher and Goldstone, highlights the importance of civil-society groups. During the revolution the various groups that constituted the National Transitional Council claimed to be the legitimate government of Libya (BBC News, 2011). International assistance followed. The National Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) began a bombing campaign and targeted the regime's weaponry and communications systems. In addition, many rebels received combat training from Britain, France, Italy, Qatar and the UAE, prior to the attack on Tripoli in August 2011 (Brahimi, 2011).

Tribalism

Tribalism is politically significant in Libya because these groups for substituted political parties and other cohorts that would ideologically unite people. The history of the tribes and the tribe's relationship with Gaddafi provides reasons as to why certain tribes would support his regime. Generally if the tribe had a rapport with his regime or if it received

some type of material benefits, its members would support the regime. The tribes'

relationship with Gaddafi determined their support (or lack of support) for the revolution

against his regime. "Col. Gaddafi sought to placate tribal leaders and win their support

by appointing them to local governing councils, but he kept the real prize of military and

security appointments for the Gaddafa [tribe]" (Mishkin, 2011, p. 6). His goals included

corrupting Libya through bribing leaders with power, and using tribal and clan leaders to

oppress the public.

In the 1980s Gaddafi united the Gaddafa (his tribe), Margha, Warfalla tribes

among others in the Tripolitania and Fezzan region (Jebnoun, et al., 2013). These tribes

became loyal to Gaddafi. Consequently Gaddafi placed members of these tribes in high

government positions solely because of their political ties. Some tribe members became

generals and commanding officers in security branches. Tripolitania and Fezzan lie in

the western regions of Libya, and these tribes became known for their support of Gaddafi

and his regime. However, in the 1969 coup against King Idris, he ousted tribal members

in the east, like the Zawiya tribe; and they had little representation in Gaddafi's

government. Tribes from the east came to believe that the western tribes were favored

by the regime.

Gaddafi created the People's Social Leadership Committee (PSLC), which

comprise tribal leaders, heads of prominent families, and other influential people. The

committee's purpose was to ensure social stability and prevent opposition from tribes and

all families holding political ties with Gaddafi (Jebnoun, et al., 2013). This government

committee had an extremist, corrupt, and zealot-minded agenda. It tried to brainwash the

citizens and used tribes to infiltrate people's homes and communities. Gaddafi used the

committee to regulate Libyan society exactly as how Gaddafi desired. He did not want inconsistency amongst the federal and local laws; by placing these leaders in supervisory positions, he hoped that a revolt would not occur.

In 1993, Gaddafi accused officers from the Warfalla of participating in an unsuccessful coup to overthrow his regime. Consequently some Warfalla leaders were executed, and Warfalla tribal ties with Gaddafi weakened.

Gaddafi tried to create and continue oil related strife amongst members of Libya, as well as favor tribes loyal to him by sharing more national wealth with them. Yet, the common antipathy toward Muammar Gaddafi motivated these tribes to work collaboratively. Many of the eastern tribes opposed Gaddafi, but some members from the tribes that benefited from Gaddafi also joined anti-Gaddafi protests. The benefits that they received did not outweigh the injustices they saw Gaddafi carry out, so some joined the opposition.

In March of 2011, tribal and community leaders met at a conference in Istanbul, Turkey. Over 100 leaders assembled and deliberated on the future of Libya in the absence of Muammar Gaddafi. At the conference they reaffirmed many things: Gaddafi needed to be removed from his position; the National Transitional Council should oversee Libya's transition from Gaddafi's rulership, tyranny should cease; and the all groups defending the regime should be accountable for their inhumane actions (Tripoli Post, 2011). The various tribes that were represented at this conference demonstrated the "cross-class" coalition factor that Lacher and Brahimi indicated. Representatives of the different classes, and members of the community came toget her. Oil workers, lawyers, students, politicians, private-sector workers, public-sector workers, among others were

represented. Many of the tribes joined the National Transitional Council as they were the major opposition group.

Tribes such as the Warfallah, Zawiya, Bani Walid, and Zintan officially withdrew their support for Gaddafi, and deserted their camp and had their military join the opposition (Izzadeen, 2011). Some tribes threatened to close down the oil fields in their territories if Gaddafi's continued his coercive and inhumane actions against Libyans. The tribes against Gaddafi were effective partly because of their number—tens of thousands. All of Libyans who participated in the revolution advanced the revolt and expedited the process of overthrowing Gaddafi. The large numbers of people allowed the Libyans to act in different roles as international representatives attending conferences with the Contact Group on Libya and meetings that strategized how to oust Gaddafi with international leaders, while others served as either protesters, or combatants for the New Libyan Army. Usually the National Transitional Council's executive officials met with international leaders and organizations—NATO, United Nations, the Contact Group, and the like—that would fund, assist, and join Libya in their revolt.

Other Libyans were protesters who, participated in demonstrations that received worldwide recognition. Libyans camped out over night in cities to begin protesting the next day. Many of these pro-democracy protests were dangerous and violent. As thousands of Libyans congregated in the streets, some rebels threw stones and petrol bombs, and began to light vehicles afire while chanting anti-government slogans (BBC News, 2011). The protesters also gathered to honor those who were shot, bombed, or killed during a protest by Gaddafi forces. Many Libyans opposed the regime and they

had no plans of backing down from Gaddafi. Though the funerals were not protests, they demonstrated unity and symbolic messages to the government.

In retaliation, Gaddafi forces sprayed the crowds with hot-water cannons and tear gas, and used guns both to scare and to kill citizens. Both the opposition forces and the regime contributed to the numerous deaths. Habib al-obaidi, head of intensive care unit at the Man-Al-Jale hospital in Libya, said, "The problem is not the number of those killed but how they were killed. One of the victims was obliterated after being hit by an RPG to the abdomen" (Reuters, 2011). Al-Obaidi's testimony conveys the ruthlessness and extreme violence of these pro-democracy protests.

The media attention caused influential international actors to notice the rebellion. The demonstrations also elevated the momentum of the revolt. The regime's rough treatments of demonstrations became an urgent human-rights matter that predisposed spectators to assist Libya. As a result, prominent leaders started to call for Gaddafi's resignation. However, the media did not bring much attention to the Libyans who participated in combat.

The National Transitional Council organized a rebel army with tribal members some of whom had no combative experience. Those with experience took leadership positions and directed missions to overtake cities. However some Libyans did not join the NTC and battled Gaddafi's forces separately.

Tribe identification is significant for everyday Libyan life because members of the same will tribe have similar philosophies and beliefs. This trait worked in the opposition's advantage because leaders would rally up their whole tribe to promote and fight for the resistance. Furthermore, the tribes were used to identify which civilians (and

areas) were for or against Gaddafi, which made it easier for Libyans to congregate and mobilize.

As mentioned before, Libyans were able to act in three roles during the revolution: as international representatives (liaisons to international organizations), as protesters (during demonstrations or uprisings), or as combatants (to battle against Gaddafi's regime). All roles helped destabilize sultantistic regime. Any tribal member could participate in these three roles, thus making the opposition's number extremely large. So many people opposed the government that it could not suppress everyone. The tribal opposition's strength lay in its numbers.

The various tribal representation in the revolution illustrated the country's mutual opinion. Most Libyans believed that Gaddafi needed to be ousted from his position. Getting the majority of a county to agree on an issue is difficult because of the different interests of the citizens. For instance, Libyans wanted transparent democracy, but many had differing views on how to build such a government.

After reviewing the literature I argue that most tribes acted as one body instead of fragmented parts that Gaddafi desired; and Gaddafi hoped that the Libyan geography, mainly where the tribes were located, would deter them from congregating and communicating with each other. The tribes were geographically spread apart in Libya, but the mission to battle forces remained the common goal of many tribes. Because of their unity, they overthrew Gaddafi. Though some tribes remained loyal to Gaddafi, many of his closest allies did not. Some leaders stopped accepting bribes from his regime. Since Gaddafi's bribes became ineffective to some of his allies, it was easier to

find him in the latter months of 2011. There could have potentially been more civilian casualties and the revolt could have been a failure.

As mentioned before, the number of people and their various roles they played in were some of the reason why the revolution was successful. This group of cross-class coalitions participated in the National Transitional Council and worked in collaboration with the international organizations and its leaders. The tribes were the foundation of the cross-class coalitions and there membership inside created an outlet to engage in anti-government groups outside of their tribal community.

National Transitional Council

The National Transitional Council led and represented the tribes that opposed Gaddafi. It was formed on March 5, 2011 and immediately began reaching out to Western and Arab allies (Temehu, 2011). Its purpose was to officially represent the February uprising demonstrators, to organize movements to liberate Libya from Gaddafi's rule, and to draft a new constitution (Temehu, 2011). Other groups wanted to lead the Libyan Civil War as the NTC did, but those groups submitted to the NTC's leadership and served under them.

The NTC was remarkably successful partly because council members (prior to their membership with the NTC) attained high and prestigious positions in government, law, or the military. The leaders that composed the 33-member council were of high caliber in that some were former heads of ministries, lawyers, and businessmen (Murphy, 2011). The council was morally upright and attained national influence through their former positions. The head of National Transitional Council was Mustafa Abdul Jalil, who was also the former Minister of Justice in Libya. Other extremely influential actors

included Moahmood Jibril, who served as the head of international affairs and of the

NTC executive committee and was the former chairman of the national Economic

Development Board, Abdul Hafez Ghoga, who was the NTC vice-chairman and official

spokesman and was a human right lawyers and the former president of the Libyan Bar

Association, and Fathi Tirbil Salwa, who was an activist whose arrest triggered

demonstrations against Gaddafi (Financial Times, 2011).

The NTC influenced how the world perceived the revolution. In demonstrations

and news interviews, it portrayed Gaddafi as an evil leader and argued that all Libyans

would be in desolation if he were not overthrown. A member from the NTC told a news

reporter,

> Gaddafi is ready to kill any number of Libyans. He is equal to Hitler in
>
> the scale of Libya. He has no relations with the people and has no mercy
>
> for them. … All his projects were self-centric and he was always busy
>
> with the idea of immortality and would do anything that will keep his
>
> name engraved in the history, bad or good doesn't matter (Duraid, 2011).

Comments like these conveyed unambiguously negative images of Gaddafi.

Many international actors believed in what the NTC told them. A senior member

from the NTC, Abdul-Moneim al-Houni, who was a former ambassador to Egypt,

"Called on the Arab states to recognize the legitimacy of this body [Libya] as the state of

the Libyan people" (The Majalla, 2011). Subsequently, sixteen countries recognized the

NTC by March 2011. Support continued to grow afterwards.

The NTC had a military wing, which was led by General Abul Fattah Younis, a

former official from the Libyan Army. Younis defected on February 22, 2011 with 9,000

soldiers, a third of whom were members of the special-forces (Temehu, 2011). The army branch of the NTC was not as skillful and strategic as the executive branch of the NTC. The executive branch conducted meetings and planned activities in an organized manner, whereas the army was chaotic. Members were confused as to who was their leader, and the hierarchical structure of authority often changed. Furthermore, the New Libyan Army comprised military defectors and inexperienced civilians. The civilians were passionate but lacked military skills, even after a three-week weapons-training program (Wigglesworth, 2011). Despite their inexperience, they were able to bring down Gaddafi's forces.

The NTC received weapons, medical aid, finances, and other support from international actors. National governments and international organizations recognized the NTC's legitimacy as a sovereign interim government and as the official representative of the Libyan people. As Jack Goldsmith (2000) notes, sovereignty defines nationhood. "It underlies international law's requirement of state consent to treaties and customary international law. And it explains why nations respect territorial borders, confer and deny recognition, and honor diplomatic immunity" (p. 959). When many high and respected rulers do not believe a body, a state, or ruler is sovereign, then it is not. So, the international community's decision to recognize the National Transitional Council helped to delegitimize and strip Gaddafi of his power over Libya.

The war between Gaddafi versus Libyans morphed into a war between Gaddafi versus Libyans, NATO, United Nations, France, United States, and England, among many others. In other words, the conflict evolved from a dissension between the public

and their national leader, into a struggle between two governments claiming sovereignty within Libya. Libya thus received considerable aid, from the international arena.

International Assistance

The international community did not perceive Gaddafi and his regime as a legitimate governing system partly because he continued to violate human rights. Gaddafi therefore was no longer viewed as the ruler of Libya; he was recognized as a domestic terrorist.

France quickly recognized the NTC as legitimate and trustworthy; French leaders offered support and assistance to the members of the NTC (Stratfor, 2013). All international actors did not act as quickly as did France. Many governments were not sure if the NTC was another terrorist group. They lacked details regarding the situation in Libya and could not conclude if this dispute differed from other disputes occurring in other countries. France, furthermore, wanted to be known as the European continent's leader on foreign and military affairs. The French thought that by taking the lead in offering military assistance and medical aid to Libya, France would be considered Europe's most militarily capable power (Stratfor, 2013). Arguably, other countries like Italy, United Kingdom, and United States intervened because Libya is a major exporter of oil, natural gas, and petroleum. It is beneficial having a stable government, or better yet a stable democracy that continues exporting resources. So conceivably, the NTC could have been used as puppets by foreign powers to institute democracy and overthrow Gaddafi for material reason.

The major risk for foreign powers in entering the dispute was that Gaddafi might win the war. This would damage international oil trade. Nevertheless, supporting the NTC in the end benefited nations that invested resources into the revolution. The

Libyans became free; Gaddafi was executed; and the country headed toward a stable government.

France

As mentioned, France chose to be the first respondent to the pleas of the NTC. France became the middleman between the opposition group and international actors. France advocated on the NTC's behalf to leaders of nations and thus channeled aid to Libya.

When Gaddafi and his regime retaliated against the February demonstrators, nations perceived his actions to be tragic and inhumane. Foreign leaders accused him of "attacking his own people" and classified him as a "thug" (Spencer, 2011). Nations and non-governmental organizations saw the situation as a humanitarian issue. That motivated actors like France and NATO to respond to Libya. As the revolution progressed, that motive evolved.

The French, recognizing the civil war as a humanitarian operation, flew two airplanes full of medical supplies, doctors and nurses to the opponents of Colonel Gaddafi (Reuters, 2011). Meanwhile, Bernard-Henry Lévy, a French philosopher, organized a meeting on March 10, 2011 between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and a few NTC representatives. Lévy had travelled to Benghazi and met with the NTC members prior to the March 10th meeting and agreed to connect them with President Sarkozy. In an interview with magazine *New Perspective Quarterly*, Lévy stated, "I met these people from the National Council of Transition and, in particular, of my country from Benghazi to tell him, There are many people here, good people; these people who hold the go on to the conclusion of his criminal logic" (Fuller, 2011). Immediately after the meeting with Sarkozy, Lévy agreed to meet with the NTC. Lévy said that his purpose

was, "To protect civilians. To prevent the bloodbath Gadaffi is anticipating. And, beyond that, to break the military machine that Gaddafi, as you know, had turned against his own people (Fuller, 2011).   Lévy was a known political adversary of President Sarkozy. Nevertheless he agreed to support the NTC.

In June, France reported that it had armed rebels in Libya. A French military spokeswoman stated, "France dropped light armaments, including guns and rocket-propelled grenades, in the Nafusa Mountains in western Libya in early June to help rebel forces who were (in a very deteriorating situation) under threat from the Libyan military" (Birnbaum, 2011).

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enforced the United Nations Resolution 1973, No-Fly Zone over Libya, which authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians (Uhm, 2011). A No-Fly Zone is a mandate that restricts aircraft from flying over a certain area unless the organization that has ordered the No-Fly makes an exception. In this case, NATO regulated the NFZ mandate and was responsible for shooting down those aircrafts that were not in compliance. These were largely Gaddafi forces and allies of Gaddafi forces. A NATO resolution tightened the asset freeze and arms embargo established by Resolution 1970. Inspections of packages suspected to violate the arms embargo rules were increased (United Nations, 2011A). These sanctions prevented Gaddafi from collecting weapons or other aid that would support his military.

NATO forces demolished the tanks and anti-aircraft weapon of Gaddafi's forces. The charge was to take "all necessary measures" against the regime yet protect civilians. This posed an extremely difficult task because forces needed to be extremely careful

where their strikes landed. Some civilian homes and regime facilities were in close

proximity. Therefore NATO slowed its bombing operations (Daalder and Stavridis,

2012).

Nevertheless NATO still completed its operations. In approximately two months,

"NATO and its partners have flown more than 2,800 sorties, including almost 1,200

strike missions, which represents over 40 percent of the total sorties flown," and they

completed 73 humanitarian assistance movements (United Nations, 2011A). In the

opinion of Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis (2012), the NATO strikes and the No-Fly

Zone resolution saved tens of thousands of lives and prevented mass destruction by

Gaddafi and his regime. The speed of NATO's response benefited Libya as well.

Hypothetically, if NATO took a long time to respond, Gaddafi forces could have

overthrown the resistance.

United States

The United States supported the Libyan people. In its rhetoric, America tends to help

countries that lack democracy and that are suffering inhumane attacks by their national

figurehead. In this case, the United States supported NATO. The United States sent

airstrikes. President Obama chose to collaborate with other groups instead of fighting

alone. This strategic action allowed other countries and groups to share military,

medical, and financial resources with the opposition. The United States did not have to

strain its resources in a military blitz. Horace Campbell (2013) mentions that the United

States deployed, "key military assets including intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and tanker aircraft all of which were essential elements

of alliance operations" (p. 78).

In addition, America bolstered preexisting opposition groups, like the National Transitional Council. In April, President Obama under his drawdown authority, authorized $25 million in non-lethal aid—medical supplies, uniforms, boots, tents, personal protective gear, radios, and Halal meals—to the National Transitional council (Fox News, 2011). Military assegai (spear with an iron tip) and other instruments of destruction were not given to Libya because the U.S. feared terrorist groups would clutch the weapons. Instead, the Obama administration allayed its sanctions against Libya, which allowed those tribal groups that opposed Gaddafi to profit from the oil sales and fund military weapons for the NTC (Fox, 2011). This also permitted U.S. companies to engage in business with Libyan companies that produced oil and petroleum.

Contact Group on Libya

While NATO attacked forces in Libya, a group of 32 countries and 7 international organizations created the Contact Group on Libya. This group sought political solutions for Libya and intended to provide "leadership and overall political direction to the international effort in close coordination with the United Nations, African Union, Arab League Organization of the Islamic Conference and European Union to support Libya" (Telegraph, 2011). The Contact Group desired to act partly because of Gaddafi's human rights violations. Members of the group discussed appropriate international support to help Libya move in a stable political direction, away from corrupt democracy, and closer more specifically the National Transitional Council's executive board—would form an interim government and negotiate a new constitution.

The Contact Group encouraged its participating countries to pledge and raise money for Libya. Qatar pledged 100 million USD; Turkey 200 million USD; Bahrain

pledged 5 million USD; Italy pledged 250 million Euros in cash and 100 million Euros in refined oil products (NATO, 2011). The Contact Group channeled funds through the Temporary Financial Mechanism to the NTC, so that the opposition group could finance their housing, food, electricity, and medical supplies (Xinhua, 2011).

At first the Contact Group worked behind closed doors with leaders of nations from different regions of the world. The members of the group displayed a harmonious relationship. They supported the United Nations' resolutions and NATO's implementation of those resolutions within Libya. The Contact Group's role differed from the UN, NATO, and other countries in that it served primarily as an advocacy group for the NTC. The Contact Group encouraged individual countries to assist the NTC financially. But even more than that, the Contact Group focused on a post-conflict plan in anticipation of Gaddafi's fall. The group wanted the United Nations to take the lead role in creating a new political order.

With this mission in mind, the group identified a set of objectives to accomplish that would help the group facilitate Libya's political transition. The group desired four things to happen: that Gaddafi officially resigning, that international community respect Libya's sovereignty and unity, that perpetrators who caused harm against civilians be excluded from the negotiation process (of the new constitution), and that the transition period reflect the principles composed in the NTC's Road Map (NATO, 2011).[iv] These principles were outlined in 37 objectives contingent on Gaddafi's oust; the NTC Road Map described steps to facilitate transition: move the rebel's capital to Tripoli, appoint an interim government, organize an election for the 200 member National Assembly,

transition the legitimate power from the NTC to the National Assembly (Mzioudet, 2011). The plan outlined a smooth political transition.

It is commendable that 32 countries and 7 international organizations agreed to honor the National Transitional Council's Road Map. Again, the international community chose to support the resistance because it viewed the Libyan Civil War as a humanitarian issue.

Military Support

The defectors from the Libyan Army joined the National Transitional Council and battled Gaddafi forces. As mentioned earlier, many defectors considered response to the uprising to be inhumane. According to news reports as many as 76,000 defected form the Libyan Army and formed the New Libyan Army (Shipman, 2011).   The army advanced the revolution by overtaking major cities and claiming them for the NTC. This convinced Gaddafi that the Libyans were taking back their land and country from him.

Gaddafi ordered the Libyan Army to fight off the regime rebels. However, his Libyan Army soon deteriorated. Colonel Miland surrendered to the opposition forces. He then, while in a prisoner-of-war camp, declared that Gaddafi manipulated his army and trained them to be zealots; "They are just trained very hard and they are told that Gaddafi is the most important person in the world. Your life depends on Gaddafi. If Gaddafi loses, you lose," (Sydney Morning Herald, 2011). Miland also mentioned that the regime contained divisions and factions. He attributed appearances of unity to enforced martial law and to browbeating by Libyan Army officials (Sydney Morning Herald, 2011).

It is difficult to estimate exactly when soldiers began defecting from the regime. In May 2011, 8 high-ranking officers and 120 military officials left Gaddafi's army (Al Jazeeraa, 2011A). The reception of high-caliber and experienced military officers benefited the NTC's army branch tremendously. The officers were put into leadership positions and expressed sympathy toward civilians. General Oun Ali Oun said, "What is happening to our people has frightened us. There is a lot of killing genocide…violence against women. No wise, rational person with the minimum of dignity can do what we saw with our eyes and what he asked us to do" (Al Jazeeraa, 2011B). The defectors perceived the war with a "good versus evil" mentality. By this I mean they viewed Gaddafi as blatantly evil and the Libyan resistance as good.

The mission of the New Libyan Army (NTC organized) was simply to defeat Gaddafi. The defectors had "access to large stores of weapons from looted military stockpiles" (Sydney Morning Herald, 2011). The experienced commanders brought military strategy to the untrained fighters of the NTC. Because of the defector's previous affiliation with Gaddafi and because some Libyan rebels were suspicious, the defectors did not assume every leadership positions (Levinson, 2013).

The military officers who remained with Gaddafi began to rely on an unofficial civilian army of teenagers and children armed with AK-47 rifles. Gaddafi opened military camps for children as young as 7 years-old (Sherwood, 2011). Salmeen Faroun, an 18-year-old woman who fought for the Gaddafi regime, said, "…I want to defend my country from the crusader enemy…I have the right to kill, to fight against NATO and the rats [opposition rebels]" (Sherwood, 2011). Many Libyans fighting for the regime expressed similar attitudes.

Social Media

Civil-society groups, international assistance, and military assistance are not the sole factors that contributed to the delegitimization of sultanistic regimes. Social media and the Internet also played significant roles during the Arab Spring. Media outlets such as *Facebook, Twitter,* and *Youtube* were used to organize groups and create awareness of the revolution. So far, there is no evidence that indicates social media actually initiates social movements, but there is evidence that rebels use it to advance it. "These scholars have deduced that, even if social media cannot be defined as the 'engine' of revolutions, they played an important role in affecting the actions of small groups of skillful activists who promoted the mass demonstrations" (Comunello and Anzera, 2012).

Contemporary regimes are finding it more difficult to control social media and the Internet. Clay Shirky (2011) mentions that this is a "dictator's dilemma" or "conservative dilemma" because it increases public access to freedom of speech and assembly. It is a dilemma because sultanistic dictators will have trouble prohibiting propaganda and censor critics of the regime (Shirky, 2011). Consequently, if the regime decides to shutdown Internet access to ban political propaganda, the shutdown may be the catalyst to increase criticism and start a revolution. The dictators want to keep citizens disorganized and limit their Internet access for this reason. In theory, rebels who use the Internet for political mobilization have better chances of destabilizing their regime than if they did not have Internet accessibility.

Analysis

Discussion

Scholarly literature has broad themes about circumstances that can affect major political change. Yet, the most significant of these circumstances are civil-society groups who join together, international actors who delegate resources to the opposition group, and military personnel who defect from the regime and join civilians to combat against the sultan's forces. But generally the success of a revolution is based on how instead of the sequence of these three circumstances occurring.

The Libyan Civil War timeline illustrates that demonstrations from various civil-society groups and people in different Libyan towns first rallied against Gaddafi. They occupied streets by the thousands and blockaded government buildings. The news reported Gaddafi forces using live ammunition against the civilians and injuring and killing them. France responded first, with medical aid and began to reach out to rebels to offer support. Shortly after, numerous civil-society groups united as the National Transitional Council. Subsequently, over 100 Libyan army officials defected from the regime, and combatted alongside the NTC. As the revolution progressed, more international actors, such as the United States, NATO, and the United Nations, extended support through airstrikes and other resources to empower the NTC. Nations created the National Contact on Libya to devise a plan on how to assist Libya in their political transition. Simultaneously, more military personnel from the Libyan Army defected and joined the New Libyan Army against Gaddafi. Furthermore, day-by-day more citizens joined the resistance and either initiated protests, joined the NTC executive committee, or combated with the New Libyan Army.

It is extremely difficult to assess exactly the number of times the conditions shaped the Libyan Revolution. Newspapers can help one uncover when significant events occurred, but they do not record every event that occurred. Though it is less difficult to estimate exactly when civil-society groups first joined together and protested, or when the international community responded to the revolution, or when Libyan military personnel defected and joined the NTC, I realized that the success of the Libyan Civil War did not depend on the sequence of these mechanisms. The three factors are necessary for success, but their sequence was not important. Separately these factors are less likely to destabilize a regime; however, the confluence of these mechanisms granted Libya the triumph they desired.

The Libyan timeline shows that mechanisms occurred more than once and often caused one another to occur. For example, international aid occurred more than once as France, the United States, NATO, and other actors gave aid when they thought it was appropriate. Shortly after that the civil-society groups combined into the National Transitional Council, and military personnel defected, as well as more international aid was given. This minute example demonstrates how each circumstance built on each other, similar to a snowball effect. As the ball of snow keeps rolling in snow, it grows in size. The snowball could not grow if it the cold temperature and the force of gravity did not converge and make it grow. Analogous to Libya, the confluence of military support, civil-society groups collaborating, and international assistance contributed to the success of delegitimizing Gaddafi's regime.

Conclusion

The contemporary literature on the Arab Spring uprisings and sultanistic regimes, focuses on civil-society groups, international assistance, social media, and military assistance as factors that led to successful overthrow of the government. More specifically, literature on the Libyan Civil War of 2011 shows that three conditions were crucial for the revolution's success. With regard to the mobilization of civil-society, elites (those with social, political or economic influence) seemed to play the biggest role in leading the National Transitional Council. Former Gaddafi administration officials and defectors from the Libyan army used their combat skills to capture regions undertaken by Gaddafi forces. Military support also affected the National Transitional Council and the civil-society groups. The establishment of the National Transitional Council allowed military defectors to lead and train the NTC. Civilians who were part of the NTC—lawyers, students, university professors, local citizens and the like—took on supporting, non-combative roles too. Nevertheless, the uniting interest to see Gaddafi ousted catalyzed and continued the momentum of the revolution.

Since the international community recognized civil-society groups like the National Transitional Council as Libya's legitimate government, nations and organizations began to send aid. Powers like the United States, the United Nations, and NATO provided assistance. I think that the level of assistance that Libyans received was so significant that the revolution could not have been successful without the aid. Also, social media outlets helped protesters organize demonstrations against the revolt, which helped them mobilize across the country.

Social-movement literature credits numerous factors that assist in the success of revolutions. Yet in the case of sultanistic regimes, the confluence of the three conditions destabilized this regime type. This study has explored the impact on the outcome of the Libyan Civil War as well as the sequence the three mechanisms occurred during the revolution. My research explored the sequence of conditions and concluded that civil-society groups first joined together to protest against the regime. France then responded first by giving medical aid to the civilians. After that, military personnel started defecting from the national army in late February.

My initial claim was that the sequence of the three circumstances determined the success of the revolt. Yet I now believe that the confluence of these three factors mutually influencing each other, determined the revolution's outcome. The conditions fed into each other. Thus, all three are significant. No single factor is more important than the other, and each condition would not be as effective without the other two.

Policy Application

Syria, east from Libya, also participated in the Arab Springs. Analogous to Libya's former regime, Syria is also a sultanistic regime—a republic under an authoritarian leader (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). In 2011, civilians protested and demanded that political prisoners be released. The Syrian regime killed dozens of people during those demonstrations. President Assad gave the people part of what they wanted and released some prisoners. As protests and demonstrations continued, the regime countered with brute force. Soon Syria was in the midst of a civil war as opposition groups battled the Syrian regime.

In Libya, a confluence of conditions helped citizens in their battle against Gaddafi: civil-society groups, military support, and international assistance. In Syria, the only conditions visibly at work are military support and civil-society groups.

In July 2011, the Free Syrian Army emerged and defectors from the Syrian army joined the new cohort (Landis, 2011). The army hopes to defeat President Assad; the militia is comprised of mostly civilians who have an antipathy towards Assad. The FSA buys its weapons on the black market, and targets spies for the regime and Syrian Army personnel (Al Jazeera, 2012). The army lacks leadership and lacks high-ranked defectors. Unlike the Libyan National Transitional Council, the Syrian National Council endorses the Free Syrian Army but is not affiliated with them. Essentially, the FSA is an unorganized army that is using personal brute force to overtake the regime. The lack of leadership and organization arguably prevents Syrians from overthrowing their regime.

In Syria there are many civil-society groups that have formed coalitions who are not working collaboratively. The main groups are the Syrian National Council for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (National Council), the Syrian National Council (SNC), the National Co-ordination Committee for Democratic Change, and the Kurdish Supreme Committee. In October 2011, various civil-society groups formed the Syrian National Council. Its aim was to "convey the Syrian people's just problems on the international platform, to form a pluralist and democratic state" (Fielding-Smith, 2011). "Islamists, secularists, Kurds and members of the grassroots committees from inside and outside Syria" joined the SNC (Fielding-Smith, 2011). Unfortunately, the SNC does not have the council of leadership, and thus lacks leadership because it is merely a coalition

of opposition groups. The National Council was established in 2012, and the other

groups were also established in response to the Arab Spring.

All of the coalitions had the same objective of political reform, but also had

competing ways of achieving the goal. Some coalitions want to receive assistance from

both Arabic and non-Arabic states, while others solely want to rely on Arabic states.

Religion and political parties also varied throughout the coalitions.

Having a number of coalitions creates disorganization because the international

community then has to choose which group to support.   Visibly, there is no main

opposition group, and therefore no single group can speak for all of Syria.   In addition, it

also portrays a lack of unity within the Syrian opposition. For instance, United States,

European Union, France, and the United Kingdom recognized the National Council as the

main opposition group, however they have not asserted command over all Syrian rebels

(BBC News, 2013). Ultimately, the international actors who are distributing aid will

establish which group is legitimate because the government will see that they are

empowered and consequently will focus their attention on suppressing that group.

Though Syrian rebels had military support and civil-society groups, they did not

have sufficient international assistance. The United Nations Security Council introduced

a resolution that would condemn human rights violations committed by the Syrian regime

that would, allow freedom of expression, that would permit opposition groups to address

their views regarding the Syrian regime without fear, and that would release all political

prisoners (United Nations, 2011B). Unfortunately the resolution did not pass. Therefore

considerable international assistance did not occur. The United States, the European

Union, and others imposed economic sanctions against Syria. The sanctions, however,

do not empower the opposition group. The sanctions merely weaken the Syrian economy. President Asaad did not relent his military when the international community summoned his resignation. In addition to the resolution, the UN-Arab-League sponsored the Geneva II talks with the Syrian government and the opposition forces separately. A three-day truce to cease the violence was agreed upon, but soon violence occurred and broke the truce (The Guardian, 2014).

Based on the conclusions that I have made in regards to destabilizing sultanistic regimes, I do not see Syrians overthrowing either their regime or President Assad in the near future. The three conditions that are necessary to oust the government are not all present. Furthermore the military support is miniscule and high-ranked defectors are not becoming members of the Free Syrian Army to lead, train, and organize the combatants. The civil-society groups are continuing to rally in protest and join the Free Syrian Army, which is necessary for any revolt. However, the Syrian Transitional Council lacks an executive board comprised of experienced members who can organize the revolt and collaborate with the international community. Lastly, there is not enough assistance from the international community. Nations are not as responsive and helpful to Syria as they were in Libya. The United Nations did not pass the resolution to cease human rights violations in Syria. The international community did not dispatch military personnel to Syria to help the opposition fight against the regime. Arguably, the world sees the Syrian Civil War as a domestic war, and the international community does not want to take a lead role in empowering the opposition or advancing its revolution.

Recommendation

Further research should explore if civil society groups, military support, and international assistance are important in countries and regions beyond Libya and the Middle East. My short analysis of the Syrian Civil War suggests that the Syrian revolution in its current state cannot succeed mainly because there is not enough international assistance. Additional research may confirm that the three conditions are necessary to destabilize sultanistic regimes and may explain why Syria has not experienced victory like Libya.

More recently, Venezuela is undergoing human rights violations by its regime. Students are conducting peaceful protests, while the government is countering their demonstrations with brute force. Perhaps further research can explore relevance of these three conditions to that case. Then we will be better able to determine if they are relevant for all successful revolutions against sultanisitic regimes, or if they were only applicable during the Arab Spring.

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Endnotes

[i] The whole government is determined by the sultan's personal goals and politics.
[ii] Linz and Stepan further mention, "The essence of sultanism is unrestrained personal rulership." … "Support is based not on a coincidence of interest between preexisting privileged social groups and the ruler but on interests created by his rule, rewards he offers for loyalty, and the fear of his vengeance" (1996).

[iii] Santos, Michelle. "Gaddafi's Green Book: Libya's Government." *The Santos Republic*. N.p., n.d. Web. 2 Oct. 2013.
[iv] The NTC Road Map also included the formation of a national congress, an interim government, and a supreme executive council.