Abstract
This study examines the traditional compensation model for real estate brokers under which both the listing and buyer brokers are paid by the seller based on a percentage of the property sales price. We argue that this model has not evolved to reflect contemporary legal agency relationships and technology-driven information availability. It therefore creates substantial transactional inefficiencies for buyers and sellers at both the matching and bargaining stages of a transaction. While there is evidence that market forces are pushing for a change in the status quo, there is also evidence that the brokerage industry is resisting this change by pursuing anti-competitive policies and laws. We explore the economics of the current and alternative compensation structures and suggest policy implications regarding anti-competitive behavior in the brokerage industry.
Recommended Citation
Miceli, Thomas J.; Pancak, Katherine A.; and Sirmans, C. F., "Is the Compensation Model for Real Estate Brokers Obsolete?" (2006). Economics Working Papers. Paper 200623.
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200623